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We present a toy theory that is based on a simple principle: the number of questions about the
physical state of a system that are answered must always be equal to the number that are unan-
swered in a state of maximal knowledge. A wide variety of quantum phenomena are found to have
analogues within this toy theory. Such phenomena include: the noncommutativity of measurements,
interference, the multiplicity of convex decompositions of a mixed state, the impossibility of discrim-
inating nonorthogonal states, the impossibility of a universal state inverter, the distinction between
bi-partite and tri-partite entanglement, the monogamy of pure entanglement, no cloning, no broad-
casting, remote steering, teleportation, dense coding, mutually unbiased bases, and many others.
The diversity and quality of these analogies is taken as evidence for the view that quantum states
are states of incomplete knowledge rather than states of reality. A consideration of the phenomena
that the toy theory fails to reproduce, notably, violations of Bell inequalities and the existence of a
Kochen-Specker theorem, provides clues for how to proceed with this research program.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.67.-a
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we introduce a simple toy theory based
on a principle that restricts the amount of knowledge an
observer can have about reality. Although not equivalent
to quantum theory nor even competitive as an explana-
tion of empirical phenomena, this theory bears an un-
canny resemblance to the latter insofar as it reproduces
in detail a large number of phenomena that are typically
taken to be characteristically quantum. This, and the
fact that the object analogous to the quantum state in
the toy theory is a state of incomplete knowledge, are
the grounds upon which we argue for our thesis, that
quantum states are also states of incomplete knowledge.
We begin by clarifying the dichotomy between states
of reality and states of knowledge. To be able to refer to
this distinction conveniently, we introduce the qualifiers
ontic, (from the Greek ontos, meaning “to be”) and epis-
temic (from the Greek episte¯me¯, meaning “knowledge”).
An ontic state is a state of reality, whereas an epistemic
state is a state of knowledge. To understand the content
of the distinction, it is useful to study how it arises in an
uncontroversial context: that of classical physics.
The first notion of state that a student typically en-
counters in their study of classical physics is the one as-
sociated with a point in phase space. This state provides
a complete specification of all the properties of the system
2(in particle mechanics, such a state is sometimes called
a “Newtonian state”). It is an ontic state. On the other
hand, when a student learns classical statistical mechan-
ics, a new kind of state is introduced, corresponding to
a probability distribution over the phase space (some-
times called a “Liouville state”). This is an epistemic
state. The critical difference between a point in phase
space and a probability distribution over phase space is
not that the latter is a function. An electromagnetic field
configuration is a function over three-dimensional space,
but is nonetheless an ontic state. What is critical about a
probability distribution is that the relative height of the
function at two different points is not a property of the
system (unlike the relative height of an electromagnetic
field at two points in space). Rather this relative height
represents the relative likelihood that some agent assigns
to the two ontic states associated with those points of the
phase space. The distribution describes only what this
agent knows about the system.
There is one case wherein the distinction between an
ontic state and an epistemic state breaks down, and that
is for epistemic states describing complete knowledge,
since the latter also contain a complete specification of
a system’s properties. For example, states of complete
knowledge in a classical theory are represented by Dirac-
delta functions on phase space, and these are associated
one-to-one with the points of phase space. The epistemic
states with which we shall be interested in this paper –
the ones with which we hope to associate quantum states
– are those describing incomplete knowledge.
The standard view among physicists and philosophers
of physics is that pure quantum states are ontic states.
Only mixed quantum states are taken to be epistemic
states, specifically, states of incomplete knowledge about
which pure quantum state is really occurrent. In a vari-
ant of this view, even the mixed quantum states are in-
terpreted as ontic (this approach is motivated by the fact
that a mixed state may be expressed as a convex sum of
pure states in many different ways). We shall describe
proponents of both of these viewpoints as proponents of
the ontic view of quantum states. In contrast, the the-
sis we wish to defend is that all quantum states, mixed
and pure, are states of incomplete knowledge. This view-
point will be referred to as the epistemic view of quantum
states.
The ontic view of quantum states has a long history in
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schro¨dinger
initially interpreted the quantum state as a physical
wave, and never wholly abandoned this view. In the
classic textbooks of Dirac [1] and of von Neumann [2],
the quantum state is taken to provide a complete speci-
fication of the properties of a system. This is also true of
both collapse theories [3, 4, 5] and Everett-type interpre-
tations [6, 7]. Even within the popular hidden variable
theories, such as the deBroglie-Bohm theory [8, 9, 10]
and the modal interpretation [11, 12, 13], although the
quantum state has an epistemic role to play in specifying
the probability distribution over hidden variables, it is
fundamentally an ontic state insofar as it acts as a guid-
ing wave, causally influencing the dynamics of the hidden
variables. The tension between the epistemic and ontic
roles of the quantum state in these interpretations has
understandably troubled many authors, and although ef-
forts have been made to reduce the tension [10], these
have tended to assign less rather than more epistemic
significance to the quantum state.
The epistemic view, although less common than the
ontic view, also has a long tradition. As we shall see
in detail further on, Einstein’s argument for the incom-
pleteness of quantum mechanics (which is most clear in
his correspondence with Schro¨dinger [14] but was made
famous in the EPR paper [15]) is an argument for an epis-
temic view of quantum states. The work of Ballentine on
the statistical interpretation [16, 17] can be interpreted
as a defense of the epistemic view, as can that of Emerson
[18]. Peierls was also an early advocate of this interpre-
tation of the quantum state [19]. It is only recently, with
the advent of quantum information theory, that the epis-
temic view has become more widespread, with the most
convincing and eloquent advocate of the approach being
Fuchs [20]. Indeed, our work owes much of its inspira-
tion to Fuchs’s research program, in particular, the idea
of deriving quantum phenomena from a principle that
maximal information is incomplete and cannot be com-
pleted [21, 22].
Despite the fact that the epistemic view appears to
be on the rise, our impression is that many would-be
supporters have failed to completely abandon their ontic
preconceptions, perhaps due to the ubiquity of ontic lan-
guage in the literature and perhaps due to a vague feel-
ing that the epistemic path is one that has been shown
to be inconsistent. We hope through this article to cor-
rect some of these misconceptions and to increase the
respectability of this viewpoint.
We shall argue for the superiority of the epistemic view
over the ontic view by demonstrating how a great num-
ber of quantum phenomena that are mysterious from the
ontic viewpoint, appear natural from the epistemic view-
point. These phenomena include interference, noncom-
mutativity, entanglement, no cloning, teleportation, and
many others. Note that the distinction we are empha-
sizing is whether the phenomena can be understood con-
ceptually, not whether they can be understood as math-
ematical consequences of the formalism, since the latter
type of understanding is possible regardless of one’s in-
terpretation of the formalism. The greater the number
of phenomena that appear mysterious from an ontic per-
spective but natural from an epistemic perspective, the
more convincing the latter viewpoint becomes. For this
reason, the article devotes much space to elaborating on
such phenomena.
Of course, a proponent of the ontic view might argue
that the phenomena in question are not mysterious if one
abandons certain preconceived notions about physical re-
ality. The challenge we offer to such a person is to present
a few simple physical principles by the light of which all
3of these phenomena become conceptually intuitive (and
not merely mathematical consequences of the formalism)
within a framework wherein the quantum state is an on-
tic state. Our impression is that this challenge cannot be
met. By contrast, a single information-theoretic princi-
ple, which imposes a constraint on the amount of knowl-
edge one can have about any system, is sufficient to de-
rive all of these phenomena in the context of a simple toy
theory, as we shall demonstrate.
A few words are in order about the motivation for such
a principle. In Liouville mechanics, states of incomplete
knowledge exhibit phenomena analogous to those exhib-
ited by pure quantum states. Among these are the ex-
istence of a no-cloning theorem for such states [21, 23],
the impossibility of discriminating such states with cer-
tainty [21, 24], the lack of exponential divergence of such
states (in the space of epistemic states) under chaotic
evolution [25], and, for correlated states, many of the
features of entanglement [26]. On the other hand, states
of complete knowledge do not exhibit these phenomena.
This suggests that one would obtain a better analogy
with quantum theory if states of complete knowledge
were somehow impossible to achieve, that is, if some-
how maximal knowledge was always incomplete knowl-
edge [21, 22, 27]. This idea is borne out by the results
of this paper. In fact, the toy theory suggests that the
restriction on knowledge should take a particular form,
namely, that one’s knowledge be quantitatively equal to
one’s ignorance in a state of maximal knowledge.
It is important to bear in mind that one cannot de-
rive quantum theory from the toy theory, nor from any
simple modification thereof. The problem is that the
toy theory is a theory of incomplete knowledge about
local and noncontextual hidden variables, and it is well
known that quantum theory cannot be understood in this
way [28, 30, 31]. This prompts the obvious question: if
a quantum state is a state of knowledge, and it is not
knowledge of local and noncontextual hidden variables,
then what is it knowledge about? We do not at present
have a good answer to this question. We shall there-
fore remain completely agnostic about the nature of the
reality to which the knowledge represented by quantum
states pertains. This is not to say that the question is
not important. Rather, we see the epistemic approach
as an unfinished project, and this question as the central
obstacle to its completion. Nonetheless, we argue that
even in the absence of an answer to this question, a case
can be made for the epistemic view. The key is that one
can hope to identify phenomena that are characteristic
of states of incomplete knowledge regardless of what this
knowledge is about.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we
introduce our foundational principle – that there is a
balance between knowledge and ignorance in a state of
maximal knowledge – and define our measures of knowl-
edge and ignorance. From this starting point, and a few
other assumptions, we derive the toy theory. We be-
gin in Sec. III by considering the simplest possible sys-
tem that can satisfy the principle. In Sec. IV we con-
sider pairs of these systems, and in Sec. V, triplets. For
each of these cases, we determine the epistemic states,
measurements and transformations that are allowed by
the principle, as well as the manner in which epistemic
states must be updated after a measurement. Along the
way, we draw attention to various analogues of quantum
phenomena. Some additional analogues are enumerated
in Sec. VI, while in Sec. VII we identify some quantum
phenomena that are not reproduced by the toy theory
and consider what these teach us about how to proceed
with the epistemic research program. In Sec. VIII, we
discuss related work, specifically, Kirkpatrick’s playing
card model [32], Hardy’s toy theory [33], Smolin’s ”lock-
boxes” [34], Zeilinger’s foundational approach [35] and
Wootters’ discrete Wigner function [36]. We conclude in
Sec.IX with some questions for future research. Some ad-
ditional material is presented in the appendices, namely,
a discussion of why the toy theory for N elementary sys-
tems cannot be understood as a restriction upon quan-
tum theory for N qubits, and of the significance of our
results for information-theoretic derivations of quantum
theory.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE BALANCE PRINCIPLE
The toy theory is built on the following foundational
principle:
If one has maximal knowledge, then for
every system, at every time, the amount of
knowledge one possesses about the ontic state
of the system at that time must equal the
amount of knowledge one lacks.
We call this the knowledge balance principle. As stated,
it is not sufficiently explicit, because the manner of quan-
tifying the amount of knowledge one possesses and the
amount one lacks has yet to be specified. Although the
measure of knowledge that we adopt is very simple, it is
not a conventional one, and consequently we must define
it carefully.
We begin by introducing the notion of a canonical set
of yes/no questions. This is a set of yes/no questions that
is sufficient to fully specify the ontic state, and that has
a minimal number of elements. To clarify this notion,
consider a situation wherein there are four possible ontic
states. A set of questions that will determine which of
the four applies is: “Is it 1, or not?”, “Is it 2, or not?”,
“Is it 3, or not?” and “Is it 4, or not?”. This questioning
scheme is inefficient however. A more efficient scheme
divides the set of possibilities into two with every ques-
tion. Indeed, one can fully specify the ontic state with
just two questions, for instance: “Is it in the set {1,2}, or
not?” and “Is it in the set {1,3}, or not?”. As there are
four answers to two yes/no questions, two is the minimal
number of questions that can possibly specify which of
four states applies. So the two questions just described
4form a canonical set. Note also that there can be many
canonical sets of questions. For instance, a different pair
of questions, namely, “Is it in the set {1,2}, or not?” and
“Is it in the set {2,3}, or not?” also form a canonical set.
With the notion of a canonical set in hand, we can de-
fine our measure of knowledge. It is simply the maximum
number of questions for which the answer is known, in a
variation over all canonical sets of questions. Our mea-
sure of ignorance is simply the difference between this
number and the total number of questions in the canon-
ical set.
The knowledge balance principle, made specific with
our measure of knowledge, is the starting point of the
toy theory. There are, however, a few other assumptions
that shall go into its derivation, to which we now turn.
We assume that all physical systems are such that
there can be a balance of knowledge about them. This
implies that the number of yes/no questions in a canoni-
cal set must be a multiple of two, because if this were not
the case, one couldn’t have an equality between the num-
ber of questions answered and the number of questions
unanswered. The simplest possible case is to have just
two questions in the canonical set. Because a canonical
set is, by definition, the minimal sufficient set of questions
required to specify the ontic state, it follows that for two
questions there are four possible ontic states. Thus the
simplest possible system in the toy theory has four ontic
states. We call this an elementary system.
We shall also assume that every system is built of ele-
mentary systems. For a pair of elementary systems, there
are four questions in the canonical set, and sixteen possi-
ble ontic states in all. For N systems, there are 2N ques-
tions in the canonical set and 22N possible ontic states.
This “reductionist” assumption will have very significant
consequences in the development of the toy theory, as the
knowledge balance principle will yield more constraints
for composite systems: not only must there be a balance
of knowledge and ignorance for the whole, but for every
part of the whole, right down to the smallest subsystems.
The motional degree of freedom for all systems is
treated classically, a background of flat space-time is as-
sumed and every elementary system is taken to exist at
a point in space.
We also assume that the outcome of a reproducible
measurement depends only on the ontic state of the sys-
tem being measured. Moreover, we assume that a trans-
formation applied to one system can only affect the ontic
state of that system, and not the ontic state of others. If
the systems are spatially separated, this amounts to an
assumption of locality. Further, we shall assume that an
observer’s state of knowledge about a system does not
dictate what can and can’t be done to the system, nor
does it ever determine the change that occurs in the sys-
tem’s ontic state during a measurement. This assump-
tion is motivated by the implausibility of there being a
causal relation between the mental state of the agent and
the ontic state of the apparatus or the system.
Finally, we assume that information gain about a sys-
tem is always possible. This will allow us to infer the
existence of a disturbance when a reproducible measure-
ment is performed, rather than inferring the impossibility
of reproducible measurements.
III. ELEMENTARY SYSTEMS
A. Epistemic states
An elementary system is one for which the number of
questions in the canonical set is two, and consequently
the number of ontic states is four. Although it takes two
yes/no questions to specify the ontic state, the answer to
only one of these can be known according to the knowl-
edge balance principle. Thus, the epistemic states for
which the balance occurs are those which identify the
ontic state of the system to be one of two possibilities.
Denoting the four ontic states by ‘1’,‘2’,‘3’ and ‘4’, and
disjunction by the symbol ‘∨’ (read as ‘or’), we can spec-
ify the possible epistemic states as disjunctions of the
ontic states. In all, there are six states of maximal knowl-
edge, namely,
1 ∨ 2,
3 ∨ 4,
1 ∨ 3,
2 ∨ 4,
2 ∨ 3,
1 ∨ 4. (1)
It is useful to represent these graphically as follows:
(2)
with the understanding that the four cells represent the
four ontic states, and the filled cells denote the set in
which the actual ontic state of the system is known to
lie.
For a single elementary system, the only way to have
less than maximal knowledge is for both questions in the
canonical set to be unanswered. This corresponds to the
epistemic state
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. (3)
It is denoted pictorially by
. (4)
5A single elementary system in the toy theory is analo-
gous to a system described by a two-dimensional Hilbert
space in quantum theory, called a qubit in quantum in-
formation theory. In particular, the six epistemic states
describing maximal knowledge of a single elementary sys-
tem are analogous to the following six pure qubit states
1 ∨ 2⇔ |0〉
3 ∨ 4⇔ |1〉
1 ∨ 3⇔ |+〉
2 ∨ 4⇔ |−〉
2 ∨ 3⇔ |+i〉
1 ∨ 4⇔ |−i〉 (5)
where |±〉 = 1√
2
|0〉± |1〉 , and |±i〉 = 1√
2
|0〉± i |1〉 , while
the single state of nonmaximal knowledge is analogous
to the completely mixed state for a qubit, that is,
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4⇔ I/2 (6)
where I is the identity operator on the 2-dimensional
Hilbert space. The rest of this section will demonstrate
the extent of this analogy. Note, however, that the choice
of which three epistemic states to associate with |0〉 , |+〉
and |+i〉 is simply a convention.
Disjointness. It is useful to define the ontic base of
an epistemic state to be the set of ontic states which are
consistent with it. For instance, the ontic base of 1 ∨ 2
is the set {1, 2}. If the intersection of the ontic bases of
a pair of epistemic states is empty, then those states are
said to be disjoint. A set of epistemic states are said to
be disjoint if they are pairwise disjoint. The relation of
disjointness is analogous to the relation of orthogonality
among quantum states. The fact that there are pairs of
epistemic states which are nondisjoint demonstrates that
there exists an analogue of nonorthogonality in the toy
theory.
Fidelity. One can also introduce a measure of the
degree of nondisjointness, equivalently, a measure of the
distance between a pair of epistemic states in the space
of such states. A standard measure of distance between
two probability distributions, p = (pk)k and q = (qk)k, is
the classical fidelity, defined by F (p,q) =
∑
k
√
pk
√
qk.
If we treat the epistemic states of the toy theory as
uniform probability distributions, for instance, associ-
ating the distribution (1/2, 1/2, 0, 0) with 1 ∨ 2, and
(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) with 1∨2∨3∨4, then we can use the
classical fidelity as a measure of distance. For the epis-
temic states of a single elementary system, the fidelity
between a pair takes one of four values: the value 0 if
they are disjoint, such as 1∨ 2 and 3∨ 4; the value 1/2 if
they are nondisjoint states of maximal knowledge, such as
1∨2 and 1∨3; the value 1/√2 if one is a state of maximal
knowledge, the other not, such as 1∨ 2 and 1∨ 2∨ 3∨ 4;
and the value 1 if the elements of the pair are identi-
cal. The analogous measure of distance between quan-
tum states is the quantum fidelity [37], which is defined
for a pair of density operators, ρ and σ, as Tr
√
ρ
√
σ. In
the case of a pair of pure states, |ψ〉 and |χ〉 , the fidelity
is simply the inner product squared, |〈ψ|χ〉|2 . It turns
out that the classical fidelities between pairs of epistemic
states are precisely equal to the quantum fidelities for the
analogous pairs of quantum states under the mapping of
Eq. (5). For instance, the quantum fidelity between |0〉
and |1〉 is 0, between |0〉 and |+〉 is 1/2, between |0〉 and
I/2 is 1/
√
2, and between any state and itself is 1.
Compatibility. Another useful relation to introduce
is that of compatibility. Two epistemic states are said to
be compatible if the intersection of their ontic bases is the
ontic base of a valid epistemic state. Thus, the epistemic
states 1 ∨ 2 and 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 have the ontic states 1 and
2 in common, and are therefore compatible, while 1 ∨ 2
and 2∨ 3 have only the ontic state 2 in common, and are
therefore incompatible. Whenever two observers are de-
scribing the same system, their epistemic states must be
compatible. This follows from the fact that if these indi-
viduals pool their information they will rule out any ontic
state that either one of them rules out, which is equiva-
lent to taking the intersection of the ontic bases of their
epistemic states. If their epistemic states were incompat-
ible, this would result in a final epistemic state that vio-
lated the knowledge balance principle. Note that this im-
plies that if two observers both have maximal knowledge
of a system, then their states of knowledge must be iden-
tical; there is always inter-subjective agreement among
maximally informed observers. This relation of compati-
bility is analogous to the Brun-Finkelstein-Mermin com-
patibility relation for quantum states, according to which
two states are compatible whenever the intersection of
their supports (in Hilbert space) is not null [38].
Convex combination. We now introduce a way of
combining epistemic states that is analogous to the con-
vex combination (or incoherent superposition) of quan-
tum states. A pair of epistemic states in the toy theory
must satisfy two conditions for the convex combination
to be defined. The first condition is that they be dis-
joint. The second condition is that the union of their
ontic bases must form the ontic base of a valid epistemic
state. If both conditions are met, then the epistemic
state that results by taking the union of the ontic bases
of the pair is defined to be the convex combination of
that pair. Thus, the convex combination of 1 ∨ 2 and
3 ∨ 4 is 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4, while the convex combination of
1∨2 and 1∨3 is undefined, as is the convex combination
of 1 ∨ 2 and 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. The convex combination of a
larger set of epistemic states is defined similarly.
Note that in addition to being sometimes undefined,
the convex combination of a set of epistemic states in the
toy theory also differs from the convex combination of a
set of quantum states in there being nothing analogous
to a convex sum with unequal weights.
It is useful to introduce the terms mixed and pure to
specify whether or not an epistemic state can be obtained
as a convex combination of distinct epistemic states or
not. For a single elementary system, the epistemic states
1∨2, 3∨4, 1∨3, 2∨4, 1∨4, and 2∨3 are pure, while the
6epistemic state 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 is mixed. There are in fact
many convex decompositions of 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. Denoting
convex combination by the symbol ‘+cx’, we have
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 = (1 ∨ 2) +cx (3 ∨ 4)
= (1 ∨ 3) +cx (2 ∨ 4)
= (2 ∨ 3) +cx (1 ∨ 4), (7)
Graphically,
= +cx
= +cx
= +cx
(8)
This is analogous to the fact that in quantum theory,
the completely mixed state of a qubit, I/2, has convex
decompositions
I/2 =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉 〈1|
=
1
2
|+〉 〈+|+ 1
2
|−〉 〈−|
=
1
2
|+i〉 〈+i|+ 1
2
|−i〉 〈−i| . (9)
Thus, the toy theory mirrors quantum theory in ad-
mitting multiple convex decompositions of a mixed state
into pure states. This multiplicity is a direct result of
the fact that in the toy theory, pure epistemic states are
states of incomplete knowledge.
A geometric representation of the space of epis-
temic states. In quantum theory, the Bloch sphere (or,
more precisely, the Bloch ball) offers a useful geometric
representation of the quantum states of a qubit and the
relations of orthogonality and convex combination that
hold among them [37]. Specifically, orthogonal quantum
states are represented by antipodal points on the sphere,
and every convex decomposition of a mixed state is asso-
ciated with a convex polytope that contains in its interior
the point representing the mixed state, with the vertices
of the polytope representing the elements of the convex
decomposition [39]. Similarly, the epistemic states for an
elementary system in the toy theory can be represented
by a subset of the points inside a unit ball. Disjoint
epistemic states are represented by antipodal points, and
convex decompositions of the mixed epistemic state are
represented by line segments, the endpoints of which are
the elements of the decomposition. The two pictures are
presented for comparison in Fig. 1.
Coherent superposition. One can also introduce
a way of combining epistemic states that is analogous
to the coherent superposition of quantum states. What
we seek is a binary operation that takes a pair of pure
epistemic state to another pure epistemic state (unlike
the operation of convex combination we have just in-
troduced, which takes a pair of pure states to a mixed
(b) 0
1
−
+
i+i− I2
1
1∨2
3∨4
1∨3
2∨4
1∨4 2∨31∨2∨3∨4
(a)
FIG. 1: (a) A representation of the space of epistemic states
in the toy theory, and (b) the Bloch ball representation of the
states in quantum theory.
state). Suppose the two epistemic states we seek to com-
bine are of the form a ∨ b and c ∨ d (here, of course,
a, b, c, d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and a 6= b, c 6= d). We assume that
they are disjoint, so that a, b 6= c, d. Moreover, we adopt
the convention that a < b and c < d. One can define
four new pure epistemic states from these two, namely,
a∨ c, a∨ d, b∨ c, and b∨ d. We can think of these as the
result of applying four distinct binary operations to the
original pair of states. Denoting these four operations by
+1,+2,+3, and +4, we have
(a ∨ b) +1 (c ∨ d) = a ∨ c
(a ∨ b) +2 (c ∨ d) = b ∨ d
(a ∨ b) +3 (c ∨ d) = b ∨ c
(a ∨ b) +4 (c ∨ d) = a ∨ d. (10)
The first operation can be described as follows: take the
ontic state of lowest index from the first epistemic state,
and the ontic state of lowest index from the second epis-
temic, then define a new epistemic state in terms of these.
The other three operations can be defined similarly. All
that differs is whether one takes the ontic state with
the lowest or highest index from each epistemic state.
The convention we have chosen is that +1,+2,+3 and
+4 are associated with low-low, high-high, high-low and
low-high. We call these coherent binary operations.
The four possible coherent binary operations acting on
71 ∨ 2 and 3 ∨ 4 yield
(1 ∨ 2) +1 (3 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 3, (11)
(1 ∨ 2) +2 (3 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 4, (12)
(1 ∨ 2) +3 (3 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 3, (13)
(1 ∨ 2) +4 (3 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 4, (14)
acting on 1 ∨ 3 and 2 ∨ 4 they yield
(1 ∨ 3) +1 (2 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 2, (15)
(1 ∨ 3) +2 (2 ∨ 4) = 3 ∨ 4, (16)
(1 ∨ 3) +3 (2 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 3, (17)
(1 ∨ 3) +4 (2 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 4, (18)
and acting on 2 ∨ 3 and 1 ∨ 4, they yield
(2 ∨ 3) +1 (1 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 2, (19)
(2 ∨ 3) +2 (1 ∨ 4) = 3 ∨ 4, (20)
(2 ∨ 3) +3 (1 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 3, (21)
(2 ∨ 3) +4 (1 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 4. (22)
These relations should be compared with the following
relations among quantum states:
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ |1〉) = |+〉 (23)
√
2
−1
(|0〉 − |1〉) = |−〉 (24)
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ i |1〉) = |+i〉 (25)
√
2
−1
(|0〉 − i |1〉) = |−i〉 (26)
and
√
2
−1
(|+〉+ |−〉) = |0〉 (27)
√
2
−1
(|+〉 − |−〉) = |1〉 (28)
√
2
−1
(|+〉+ i |−〉) = eipi/4 |−i〉 (29)
√
2
−1
(|+〉 − i |−〉) = e−ipi/4 |+i〉 (30)
and
√
2
−1
(|+i〉+ |−i〉) = |0〉 (31)
√
2
−1
(|+i〉 − |−i〉) = i |1〉 (32)
√
2
−1
(|+i〉+ i |−i〉) = eipi/4 |+〉 (33)
√
2
−1
(|+i〉 − i |−i〉) = e−ipi/4 |−〉 (34)
Note that the combinations we have enumerated do not
exhaust the possibilities, since for the operations +3 and
+4, the order of the arguments in the operation is im-
portant. That is, +3 and +4 are not commutative opera-
tions. For instance, (1∨2)+3(3∨4) = 2∨3 while (3∨4)+3
(1∨2) = 1∨4. The same sensitivity to ordering is found in
quantum theory for coherent superpositions with relative
phases pi/2 and 3pi/2. For instance,
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ i |1〉) =
|+i〉 while √2−1 (|1〉+ i |0〉) = i |−i〉 .
It is natural to associate the operations +1,+2,+3 and
+4 with coherent superpositions of two quantum states
where the relative weights are equal and the relative
phases of the second term to the first are 0, pi, pi/2 and
3pi/2 respectively,
+1 ⇔ 0
+2 ⇔ pi
+3 ⇔ pi/2
+4 ⇔ 3pi/2 (35)
Under this association of toy-theoretic operations with
quantum operations and under the association of epis-
temic states with quantum states expressed in (5), the
relations (11)-(22) parallel (modulo global phases) the
relations (23)-(34), with two notable exceptions. Given
the form of the relations (17) and (18), and the fact that
2 ∨ 3 maps to |+i〉 and 1 ∨ 4 maps to |−i〉 under (5),
one would expect the right hand side of (29) to be pro-
portional to |+i〉 and the right hand side of (30) to be
proportional to |−i〉 rather than vice-versa. Note that
one cannot achieve a better analogy by modifying the
associations adopted in (5) and (35). For instance, by
associating 2 ∨ 3 with |−i〉 and 1 ∨ 4 with |+i〉, the rela-
tions (17) and (18) can be made to parallel the relations
(29) and (30), however, in this case the relations (13) and
(14) fail to parallel (25) and (26). This curious failure of
the analogy shows that an elementary system in the toy
theory is not simply a constrained version of a qubit.
There are two other important respects in which our
coherent binary operations for a single elementary system
differ from those one finds in quantum theory for a qubit.
First, whereas any pair of quantum states of a qubit can
be coherently superposed, the binary operations in the
toy theory are not defined for arbitrary pairs of epistemic
states. Specifically, they are not defined for nondisjoint
epistemic states. Second, whereas there are a continuum
of different types of coherent superposition of a pair of
quantum states of a qubit, corresponding to all possible
relative weights and all possible relative phases, there are
only four coherent binary operations in the toy theory.
B. Transformations
We now consider the sorts of transformations of the
ontic states that are allowed by the knowledge balance
principle. Imagine a transformation that takes two dif-
ferent ontic states, say 1 and 2, to a single ontic state, say
3. If the epistemic state prior to the transformation was
1∨2, then after the transformation, one would be certain
that the ontic state was 3. But such an epistemic state
violates the knowledge balance principle, therefore this
transformation is not allowed. A similar example can be
devised for any many-to-one map. Thus, all such maps
are ruled out by the principle.
We are left with the one-to-one maps and the one-to-
many maps. We focus on the former here, since these
8correspond to the reversible maps. Clearly, these are
simply the set of permutations of the four ontic states.
One can describe permutations in terms of cycles. For
instance, the permutation a→ a, b→ c→ d→ b involves
two cycles: a 1-cycle, a → a, and a 3-cycle b → c →
d → b. In cycle notation, this permutation is written
as (a)(bcd). The set of permutations of 4 elements is a
group, called S4, containing 24 elements. Permutations
with the same number of cycles form a class. We list the
elements of S4, and their class structure in Table I. If
an element is written alone, it is its own inverse, whereas
elements appearing in pairs are each other’s inverses.
(14) (31) (212) (22) (4)
(1)(2)(3)(4) (234)(1) (12)(3)(4) (12)(34) (1234)
(243)(1) (1432)
(13)(2)(4) (13)(24)
(134)(2) (1243)
(143)(2) (14)(2)(3) (14)(23) (1342)
(124)(3) (23)(1)(4) (1324)
(142)(3) (1423)
(24)(1)(3)
(123)(4)
(132)(4) (34)(1)(2)
TABLE I: The class structure of the group S4 of permutations
of four elements
The valid transformations may be usefully represented
graphically by arrows between the ontic states. For in-
stance,
(123)(4) :
(13)(24) :
(13)(2)(4) :
(1234) : (36)
It is interesting to determine how the set of epistemic
states are transformed under a permutation of the ontic
states. For instance, the permutation (123)(4) leads to
the following map on the epistemic states
1 ∨ 2 → 2 ∨ 3
3 ∨ 4 → 1 ∨ 4
1 ∨ 3 → 1 ∨ 2
2 ∨ 4 → 3 ∨ 4
2 ∨ 3 → 1 ∨ 3
1 ∨ 4 → 2 ∨ 4 (37)
Representing the epistemic states in the “Bloch
sphere” picture, we see that this permutation appears
as a rotation by 120◦ about the axis that points in the
xˆ+yˆ+zˆ direction, as seen in Fig. 2(a). Similarly, the per-
mutation (13)(24) appears as a rotation by 180◦ about
the xˆ axis, as seen in Fig. 2(b). These permutations
are analogous to unitary maps in Hilbert space, which
appear as rotations in the Bloch sphere. These two ex-
amples might lead one to think that all permutations
appear as rotations in the Bloch sphere picture, but this
is not the case. A permutation such as (13)(2)(4) is a re-
flection about the plane spanned by xˆ and (yˆ+ zˆ), as seen
in Fig. 2(c), while (1234) involves a rotation of 90◦ about
xˆ and a reflection about the plane spanned by yˆ and zˆ,
as seen in Fig. 2(d). These are analogous to anti-unitary
maps in Hilbert space. Anti-unitary maps do not repre-
sent possible evolutions of a system in quantum theory
because evolution is assumed to be continuous in time.
The fact that transformations analogous to anti-unitary
maps arise in the toy theory is a consequence of the fact
that the transformations in the toy theory are discrete.
1∨2
3∨4
2∨4
1∨4 2∨3
1∨3
1∨2
3∨4
2∨4
1∨4 2∨3
1∨3
(123)(4)
(1234)
(a)
1∨2
3∨4
2∨4
1∨4 2∨3
1∨3
(13)(2)(4)
(c)
1∨2
3∨4
2∨4
1∨4 2∨3
1∨3
(13)(24)
(b)
(d)
FIG. 2: How four permutations of the ontic states appear
in the Bloch sphere representation of the space of epistemic
states.
Note that the set of all transformations for an ele-
mentary system corresponds to the symmetry group of a
tetrahedron the four vertices of which are located along
the xˆ− yˆ+ zˆ axis, the −xˆ+ yˆ+ zˆ axis, the xˆ+ yˆ− zˆ axis
and the −xˆ − yˆ − zˆ axis. These vertices are associated
with the ontic states 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
C. No universal state inverter
Given the aspects of the toy theory developed so far,
we can already demonstrate an analogy to a characteris-
tically quantum phenomenon, namely, the impossibility
of building a universal state inverter. For a single qubit,
a universal state inverter is a device that deterministi-
cally maps every pure quantum state to the orthogonal
quantum state, that is,
|ψ〉 →
∣
∣ψ¯
〉
for all |ψ〉 (38)
9where
〈
ψ|ψ¯〉 = 0. Such a map cannot be physically im-
plemented because it is not unitary [40].
The analogous task in the toy theory is to determinis-
tically map every pure epistemic state of an elementary
system to the one that is disjoint with it. Thus, we re-
quire
1 ∨ 2 ↔ 3 ∨ 4,
1 ∨ 3 ↔ 2 ∨ 4,
2 ∨ 3 ↔ 1 ∨ 4. (39)
But this transformation is impossible since it does not
correspond to any permutation of the ontic states; the
first two conditions together imply that 1↔ 4 and 2↔ 3,
which is in contradiction with the third condition.
The impossibility of universal state inversion in both
quantum theory and the toy theory can also be seen by
noting that it would appear as an inversion about the
origin in the Bloch ball representation, and such an in-
version cannot be achieved by any rotation, nor by any
combination of the rotations and reflections that are al-
lowed in the toy theory.
D. Measurements
We now turn to the nature of measurements in the
toy theory. We shall here consider only measurements
that are reproducible in the sense that if repeated upon
the same system, they yield the same outcome. For this
to be possible, the epistemic state after the measurement
must rule out all of the ontic states that are not consistent
with the outcome (otherwise, the epistemic state would
not reflect the fact that a different outcome cannot occur
upon repetition).
The knowledge balance principle imposes restrictions
on the sort of reproducible measurement that can be im-
plemented. Again, we start by ruling out a certain kind
of measurement, namely one which identifies whether or
not the ontic state is in a singleton set. To be specific,
consider the measurement which determines whether the
ontic state is 1 or not. The ‘not 1’ outcome identifies the
ontic state as being either 2 or 3 or 4. Now, if in this
measurement the outcome 1 occurs (and nothing pre-
vents it from occurring when the initial epistemic state
deems it to be possible), then by virtue of the assumed
reproducibility of measurements, the epistemic state af-
ter the measurement must rule out the ontic states 2, 3
and 4. But this would mean that after the measurement
one would be certain that the ontic state was 1, and such
a state of knowledge violates the knowledge balance prin-
ciple. Thus, the measurement considered is not allowed.
Clearly, the fewest ontic states that can be associated
with a single outcome of a measurement is two. Thus, the
only valid reproducible measurements are those which
partition the four ontic states into two sets of two ontic
states. There are only three such partitionings:
{1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4}
{1 ∨ 3, 2 ∨ 4}
{1 ∨ 4, 2 ∨ 3}. (40)
In our pictorial representation, we can represent these
as
I II III
II I III
II II II (41)
where in each case the two sets are distinguished by a
roman numeral. These three partitionings are analogous
to the following three bases in quantum theory:
{1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4} ⇔ {|0〉 , |1〉},
{1 ∨ 3, 2 ∨ 4} ⇔ {|+〉 , |−〉},
{1 ∨ 4, 2 ∨ 3} ⇔ {|+i〉 , |−i〉}. (42)
We call the set of ontic states associated with a par-
ticular outcome the ontic base of that outcome. If the
initial epistemic state has its ontic base inside the ontic
base of a particular outcome, then that outcome is cer-
tain to occur, otherwise, the outcome is not determined
by the initial epistemic state. For instance, suppose the
epistemic state is 1 ∨ 2, so that graphically we have
. (43)
If one performs the measurement that distinguishes 1∨2
from 3 ∨ 4, depicted
I II III (44)
then the first outcome is certain to occur. while if one
performs the measurement that distinguishes 1 ∨ 3 from
2 ∨ 4, depicted
II I III (45)
then the outcome is not determined. In a large ensemble
of such experiments, one expects the two outcomes to
occur with equal frequency 1. This is analogous to what
occurs in quantum theory: if the initial quantum state
is one of the elements of the orthogonal basis associated
with the measurement, then the outcome associated with
that element is certain to occur, while if it is not, only
the expected relative frequencies of the outcomes are de-
termined by the quantum state.
1 This presumes that the relative frequency of different ontic states
in the ensemble is equivalent to the probability distribution de-
fined by the epistemic state. This assumption can be questioned.
See, for instance, the work of Valentini [10].
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E. Measurement update rule
Suppose the initial epistemic state is 1 ∨ 2, a repro-
ducible measurement of 1 ∨ 3 versus 2 ∨ 4 is performed,
and the outcome 1∨3 occurs. In this case, one can retro-
dict that the ontic state of the system must have been
1 prior to the measurement. This is not in conflict with
the knowledge balance principle since the latter does not
place restrictions on what one can know, at a given time,
about the ontic state at an earlier time. The principle
does, however, place restrictions on what one can know,
at a given time, about the ontic state at that time. If it
were the case that the system’s ontic state was known to
be unaltered in the process of measurement, then one’s
description of the system prior to the measurement would
apply also after the measurement. But then, one would
know the system to be in the ontic state 1 after the mea-
surement, and this is in violation of the knowledge bal-
ance principle. Since we assume that information gain
through measurements is always possible, we must con-
clude that measurement causes an unknown disturbance
to the ontic state of the system.
In our particular example, the assumption that the
measurement is reproducible implies that the epistemic
state after the measurement must rule out the ontic states
2 and 4. Thus, the only final epistemic state that makes
the measurement result reproducible and abides by the
knowledge balance principle is 1 ∨ 3.
It follows that the nature of the unknown disturbance
must be such that although one knows that the ontic
state that applied prior to the measurement was 1, all
one knows about the ontic state that applies after the
measurement is that it is 1 or 3. Thus, the unknown
disturbance must ensure that
1→ 1 ∨ 3. (46)
Similarly, if the initial epistemic state was 3 ∨ 4 and
a measurement of 1 ∨ 3 versus 2 ∨ 4 found the outcome
1∨ 3, one could infer that prior to the measurement, the
ontic state must have been 3. However, in order to have
reproducibility and to abide by the knowledge balance
principle, it must be the case that after the measure-
ment, the ontic state is only know to be 1 or 3. Thus, the
unknown disturbance must ensure that
3→ 1 ∨ 3 (47)
These two conditions can be satisfied by assuming
that the measurement induces either the permutation
(1)(2)(3)(4) or the permutation (13)(2)(4), but that it
is not known which. For instance, if the ontic state was
1, then either it remains 1 or it becomes 3. Which of
these two possibilities occurs is unknown, so all that can
be said of the ontic state that applies after the measure-
ment is that it is 1 or 3.
This is generalized as follows. In a measurement of a∨b
versus c ∨ d, if the outcome a ∨ b occurs, then either the
permutation (a)(b)(c)(d) occurs (i.e. nothing happens to
the system) or the permutation (ab)(c)(d) occurs (if the
ontic state is a, it becomes b and vice-versa), but it is
unknown which.
Note that the possible permutations resulting from a
measurement depend only on the identity and outcome of
the measurement and not on the initial epistemic state.
This is appropriate, since the nature of someone’s knowl-
edge of a system should not influence how the ontic state
of the system evolves during a measurement. By the
same token, whether or not the system is initially corre-
lated with other systems should not influence the nature
of the evolution of the ontic state of the system during
a measurement, because the presence or absence of such
correlation is a feature of an observer’s knowledge of the
system, not a property of the system itself 2. Thus, al-
though we have derived the nature of the unknown dis-
turbance by considering an example where the system
being measured is not correlated with any other system,
the results obtained must also be applicable when such
correlation is present. We will therefore make use of the
results derived above when we consider measurements on
one member of a pair of systems in Sections IVA, IVB
and IVG.
In the case considered here, where the system of in-
terest is uncorrelated with all other systems, the nature
of the transformation of the ontic states for reproducible
maximally-informative measurements implies a particu-
larly simple rule for updating the epistemic state. The
final epistemic state is simply the set of ontic states that
are associated with the outcome obtained in the mea-
surement. This is analogous to the update rule for a re-
producible maximally-informative measurement in quan-
tum theory, where the final quantum state is simply the
eigenvector associated with the outcome obtained in the
measurement.
We now consider a few more quantum phenomena for
which we can provide an analogue in the toy theory.
F. Noncommutativity of measurements
In quantum theory, the order in which measurements
occur is important for the outcome that is obtained in
these measurements. For instance, implementing a re-
producible measurement of the basis {|0〉 , |1〉} followed
by a reproducible measurement of the basis {|+〉 , |−〉} in
general has different results from the case where they are
implemented in the opposite order. Specifically, if the
quantum state is |0〉 initially, then if the measurement of
{|0〉 , |1〉} comes first, it will yield the outcome |0〉 with
certainty. On the other hand, if it comes second, then
2 The only way in which the initial epistemic state could influence
the evolution of the ontic state is if there was a physical influ-
ence exerted by the mental state of the observer on the physical
system. In our derivation of the toy theory, we are explicitly
rejecting this sort of possibililty.
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the outcomes |0〉 and |1〉 will occur with equal proba-
bility. The reason is that the intervening measurement
of {|+〉 , |−〉} collapses the quantum state to |+〉 or |−〉
with equal probabilities, and the latter states make the
outcome of {|0〉 , |1〉} completely unpredictable.
Similarly, the order in which measurements occur in
the toy theory also has a bearing on the outcomes ob-
tained. Indeed, the example just provided has a perfect
analogue in the toy theory. We consider implementing a
reproducible measurement associated with the partition-
ing {1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4} followed by the reproducible measure-
ment associated with the partitioning {1∨ 3, 2∨ 4}, and
the same measurements in reverse order:
I II III then II I III
or
II I III then I II III . (48)
Suppose that initially the epistemic state is 1 ∨ 2,
. (49)
If the measurement of {1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4} comes first, it will
yield the outcome 1 ∨ 2 with certainty. On the other
hand, if it comes second, then the outcomes 1 ∨ 2 and
3∨ 4 will occur with equal frequency. The reason is that
the measurement of {1∨3, 2∨4} causes the epistemic state
to be updated to 1 ∨ 3 or 2 ∨ 4 with equal probabilities,
and each of these epistemic states makes the outcome of
{1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4} completely unpredictable.
G. Interference
Another quantum phenomenon that the toy theory re-
produces qualitatively is interference. We offer the fol-
lowing paradigmatic example of interference in quantum
theory. Consider three experiments:
(a) Prepare |0〉 , then measure {|+〉 , |−〉}
(b) Prepare |1〉 , then measure {|+〉 , |−〉}
(c) Prepare
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ |1〉) , then measure {|+〉 , |−〉}.
The probability distribution over the outcomes is
(1/2, 1/2) for (a), (1/2, 1/2) for (b) and (1, 0) for (c).
The probability zero for the outcome |−〉 in case (c) is,
of course, a result of the destructive interference between
the amplitude for this outcome in states |0〉 and |1〉.
Interference is often cited as evidence against the epis-
temic view of quantum states. The argument runs as
follows. If quantum states are associated with proba-
bility distributions over some hidden reality, then the
only way one could possibly understand a coherent su-
perposition of quantum states (so the argument goes)
is as a convex combination of the associated probabil-
ity distributions with weights given by the amplitudes
squared. In particular, the distribution associated with
the state
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ |1〉) must be a convex sum, with
equal weights, of the distributions associated with |0〉 and
|1〉 . But given that in a measurement of {|+〉 , |−〉} the
|−〉 outcome occurs with probability 1/2 for both |0〉 and
|1〉 , if √2−1 (|0〉+ |1〉) corresponded to a convex sum of
these possibilities, one would still expect the |−〉 outcome
to occur with probability 1/2, not probability zero.
All this argument demonstrates, however, is a lack
of imagination concerning the interpretation of coher-
ent superposition within an epistemic view. We have
already seen in Sec. III A how in the toy theory one
can define some binary operations that are distinct from
convex combination. The possibility of representing co-
herent superposition and convex combination differently
within an epistemic view is what makes interference un-
derstandable. This is made clear through the toy theory
version of the interference experiment discussed above.
Recall from Eq. (35) of Sec. III A that the toy theory
analogue of the coherent superposition
√
2
−1
(|0〉+ |1〉)
is (1∨ 2)+1 (3∨ 4) which is simply 1∨ 3. This is not the
equally weighted probabilistic sum of the two epistemic
states, which would be the epistemic state 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4.
Thus, the analogue of the three experiments are:
(a) Prepare , then measure II I III
(b) Prepare , then measure II I III
(c) Prepare , then measure II I III .
It is straightforward to see that the probability distribu-
tions over the outcomes are (1/2, 1/2) for (a), (1/2, 1/2)
for (b), and (1, 0) for (c). Thus, the empirical signature
of interference is reproduced.
Interference phenomena have led interpreters of quan-
tum theory to conclude that whatever an equally
weighted coherent superposition of two possibilities
might be, it is not the ‘or’ of those possibilities nor the
‘and’ of those possibilities. This is certainly the case in
the toy theory. The coherent combination of a pair of
disjoint pure epistemic states is neither the ‘or’ nor the
‘and’ of those states, but rather a sampling of the ontic
states from each.
IV. PAIRS OF ELEMENTARY SYSTEMS
A. Epistemic states
The simplest composite system is a pair of elementary
systems. Since each elementary system has four ontic
states, the pair has sixteen ontic states. We can repre-
sent the ontic states of the pair by conjunctions of the
possible ontic states of the constituents. Representing
conjunction by ‘·’ (read as ‘and’), the sixteen possibili-
ties are
1 · 1, 1 · 2, 1 · 3, 1 · 4, 2 · 1, 2 · 2, 2 · 3, 2 · 4,
3 · 1, 3 · 2, 3 · 3, 3 · 4, 4 · 1, 4 · 2, 4 · 3, 4 · 4. (50)
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We can represent these graphically by a 4 × 4 array of
boxes, where the rows represent the different ontic states
of system A, and the columns represent the different ontic
states of system B. Specifically, we take the box in the
jth row from the bottom and kth column from the left
to represent the ontic state j · k.
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4
A
B (51)
Since each system has two questions in a canonical set,
the pair has four questions in a canonical set. The knowl-
edge balance principle ensures that only two of these four
questions may be answered in a state of maximal knowl-
edge. This corresponds to knowing the ontic state to
be among four of the sixteen possibilities. The pure epis-
temic states are therefore disjunctions of four ontic states,
for instance,
(1 · 3) ∨ (1 · 4) ∨ (2 · 3) ∨ (2 · 4), (52)
which can be represented graphically by
(53)
where we have dropped the labels on the rows and
columns for convenience.
By applying the knowledge balance principle to each of
the systems in the pair individually, we obtain a further
constraint: at most a single question can be answered
about the ontic state of each of the systems. Thus, an
epistemic state for AB of the form
(54)
although satisfying the principle as it applies to the com-
posite AB, violates the principle as it applies to the sys-
tem B because the ontic state of B is known to be 1.
The epistemic state for AB of the form
(55)
is also ruled out by application of the principle to the
individual systems. Here, it is not the marginals that are
the problem. Rather, the problem is that a reproducible
measurement of 1 ∨ 2 versus 3 ∨ 4 on A, which has out-
come 1∨ 2 for instance, allows one to rule out 3 and 4 as
possibilities for the ontic states of A after the measure-
ment, and, as established earlier, causes the ontic state of
A to undergo an unknown permutation: either (12)(3)(4)
or (1)(2)(3)(4). However, this leaves the final epistemic
state of AB as
(56)
which corresponds to more knowledge about AB than
is allowed by the principle. We have here made use of
the assumption that the transformation that applies to
A is the same whether A is correlated with B or not,
since correlation is a feature of an observer’s knowledge
and therefore cannot determine the nature of the physical
transformation.
The full set of epistemic states that violate the knowl-
edge balance principle in some way are
(57)
together with any epistemic state that can be obtained
from one of these by a permutation of A and B, or by
any permutation of the rows and columns.
It follows that the valid states of maximal knowledge
for a pair of systems are of two types, represented as
(58)
together with those that can be obtained from these by
permutations of the rows and columns. These are analo-
gous in quantum theory to product states and maximally
entangled states respectively.
Epistemic states for composite systems can be classi-
fied according to whether they describe correlations be-
tween the systems or not. An epistemic state is said to
describe correlations between a pair of systems if some
form of knowledge acquisition about one of the systems
leads the bearer of this epistemic state to refine their de-
scription of the other system. It is clear that by these
lights epistemic states of the first type are uncorrelated
while those of the second type are correlated.
The general form of the first type of epistemic state is
(a ∨ b) · (c ∨ d), (59)
where a, b, c, d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and a 6= b, c 6= d. These
states are a conjunction of states of maximal knowledge
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for each of the systems, and thus satisfy the principle
as it applies to the subsystems. Note that one can dis-
tribute the conjunction over the disjunction to rewrite
the epistemic state as
(a · c) ∨ (a · d) ∨ (b · c) ∨ (b · d), (60)
verifying that it is a disjunction of four ontic states and
thus satisfies the principle as it applies to the pair. Some
examples of uncorrelated epistemic states are
(1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2),
(1 ∨ 2) · (2 ∨ 3),
(2 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 4),
(1 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 3), (61)
which are represented graphically as
. (62)
By Eq. (5), these are analogous to the product states
|0〉|0〉, |0〉|+i〉, |+i〉|−i〉, and |+〉|+〉 respectively.
Since such an epistemic state is simply a “product” of
the marginals for A and B, when a measurement on A
is implemented, only the marginal for A is updated, and
this occurs in precisely the manner described in Sec. III E.
For instance, if the epistemic state for the composite is
(1 ∨ 2) · (2 ∨ 3), and a measurement of 1 ∨ 4 versus 2 ∨ 3
on system A finds the outcome 1 ∨ 4, the final state is
(1 ∨ 4) · (2 ∨ 3),
→ . (63)
The general form of the second type of allowed epis-
temic state is
(a · e) ∨ (b · f) ∨ (c · g) ∨ (d · h), (64)
where a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and a 6= b 6= c 6= d,
e 6= f 6= g 6= h. Note that the marginal epistemic states
for A and B are 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. Examples of such states
are
(1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4)
(1 · 2) ∨ (2 · 3) ∨ (3 · 4) ∨ (4 · 1)
(1 · 4) ∨ (2 · 3) ∨ (3 · 1) ∨ (4 · 2)
(1 · 4) ∨ (2 · 1) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 2) (65)
which are depicted as:
. (66)
For such epistemic states, nothing is known about the
ontic states of the individual systems, but everything is
known about the relation between them. In the first ex-
ample, for instance, the two systems are known to be in
the same ontic state. In the second example, the ontic
state of B has an index that is one greater (modulo 4)
than the ontic state of A. In other words, the ontic state
of B is related to the ontic state of A by the permutation
(1234). In the third and fourth examples, the permuta-
tions are (1423) and (142)(3) respectively. There is an
epistemic state of this sort for every permutation of the
four ontic states, and thus 24 in all. These are repre-
sented graphically by the 24 ways of filling only one box
in every row and column.
The following picture emerges. Unlike in classical the-
ories, wherein one can know the relation between two sys-
tems completely and know their individual ontic states,
in the toy theory we have a trade-off. In a state of max-
imal knowledge, either one can know as much as is pos-
sible to know about the individual ontic states of a pair
of systems, in which case one has an answer to a single
question about each, yielding an uncorrelated epistemic
state, or one can know as much as is possible to know
about the relation between the two systems, in which case
one knows the answers to two questions about their re-
lation, yielding a correlated epistemic state. It has been
argued by Brukner, Zukowski and Zeilinger [41] (within
the context of a different interpretational approach) that
this sort of account captures the essence of entanglement.
It is worth noting that epistemic states of the second
type are not only correlated, they are perfectly correlated,
that is, for any form of knowledge acquisition about one
of the systems, the description of the other is refined.
Further on, we shall consider epistemic states describ-
ing imperfect correlations, for instance, in Eq. (78) of
Sec. IVC.
It is useful to examine in detail how a perfectly cor-
related epistemic state is updated if a reproducible mea-
surement is implemented on one of the subsystems. We
describe this for a generic epistemic state of the form
given in Eq. (64), and a generic measurement which dis-
tinguishes a∨ b from c ∨ d. Upon obtaining the outcome
a ∨ b, the ontic states c · g and d · h for the compos-
ite are ruled out. Thus one immediately sees that the
marginal for B after the measurement will be e∨f . More-
over, as discussed in Sec. III E, the measurement causes
system A to undergo an unknown permutation, namely,
(a)(b)(c)(d) or (ab)(c)(d). The first case yields a · e and
b · f as possible final ontic states of the composite, while
the second case yields b · e and a · f . The final epistemic
state is therefore the disjunction of these four possibili-
ties, which is simply (a∨b) ·(e∨f). As an example, if the
epistemic state forAB is initially (1·4)∨(2·3)∨(3·1)∨(4·2)
and a measurement of 2∨3 versus 1∨4 on A finds the out-
come 1∨4, the epistemic state is updated to (1∨4)·(2∨4),
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→ . (67)
The marginal for B is updated from 1∨ 2∨ 3∨ 4 to 2∨ 4,
so there has been a refinement of the description of B as
a result of the measurement on A.
B. Remote steering
“Steering” is the name given by Schro¨dinger to the phe-
nomenon that lies at the heart of the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum the-
ory [15]. We shall present the phenomenon in a manner
that is closer to the account given by Einstein in his cor-
respondence with Schro¨dinger [14] than to the account
found in the EPR paper. Alice and Bob each hold a
qubit, denoted A and B respectively, and the pair AB
is described by the quantum state 1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉) .
Suppose Alice chooses to measure the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis (in
a reproducible way) on system A. In this case, with prob-
ability 1/2 she obtains the outcome |0〉 and (following the
standard collapse rule) she updates the quantum state of
the pair to |0〉 |0〉 ,
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉)→ |0〉 |0〉 . (68)
while with probability 1/2 she obtains the outcome |1〉
and updates the quantum state of the pair to |1〉 |1〉 ,
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉)→ |1〉 |1〉 . (69)
On the other hand, if Alice chooses to measure the
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis on system A, then with probability 1/2
she obtains the outcome |+〉 and updates the quantum
state of the pair to |+〉 |+〉 ,
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉)→ |+〉 |+〉 , (70)
and with probability 1/2 she obtains the outcome |−〉
and updates the quantum state of the pair to |−〉 |−〉 ,
1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉)→ |−〉 |−〉 . (71)
Note that for one choice of Alice’s measurement, the fi-
nal quantum state for B is either |0〉 or |1〉 whereas for
the other choice, it is either |+〉 or |−〉 . In a 1935 paper
discussing this phenomenon, Schro¨dinger remarks (Ref.
[42], p. 555): “It is rather discomforting that the theory
should allow a system to be steered or piloted into one
or the other type of state at the experimenter’s mercy
in spite of his having no access to it.” Indeed, if the
quantum state is interpreted as a state of reality, so that
|0〉,|1〉,|+〉, and |−〉 are mutually exclusive states of real-
ity, then Alice’s choice of measurement can directly influ-
ence the reality in Bob’s laboratory. If the collapse occurs
instantaneously, as is generally assumed, this would cor-
respond to a nonlocal influence. To be precise, it would
lead to a failure of local causality, in the sense defined by
Bell [43].
However, this example of the steering phenomenon
does not imply a failure of local causality if one adopts an
epistemic view of quantum states.3 Indeed, we now show
that the particular example of steering described above
has a precise analogue in the toy theory despite the fact
that the latter is explicitly local. Here is how it works.
Alice and Bob each hold an elementary system, denoted
A and B respectively, and Alice’s epistemic state for the
pair AB is (1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4). Suppose Al-
ice implements the reproducible measurement on A that
distinguishes 1 ∨ 2 from 3 ∨ 4. With probability 1/2 she
obtains the outcome 1 ∨ 2 and, given the results of the
previous section, she must update her state of knowledge
to (1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2). Graphically,
→ . (72)
On the other hand, if the outcome 3∨4 occurs then Alice
updates her epistemic state for the pair to (3∨4) · (3∨4),
→ . (73)
Alice could also choose to implement the measurement
that distinguishes 1 ∨ 3 from 2 ∨ 4. She again obtains
both outcomes with equal probability. If the outcome
is 1 ∨ 3, she updates her epistemic state for the pair to
(1 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 3)
→ , (74)
while if the outcome is 2 ∨ 4, she updates her epistemic
state to (2 ∨ 4) · (2 ∨ 4)
→ . (75)
3 Of course, a failure of locality is implied by correlations that
violate Bell’s inequalities [31], and consequently there is nothing
analogous to such correlations in the toy theory. This will be
discussed in section VII.
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Note that the right hand sides of Eqs. (72)-(75) are pre-
cisely analogous to those of Eqs. (68)-(71) under the map-
ping of Eq. (5).
The important point to note about the steering phe-
nomenon in the toy theory is that the choice of measure-
ment at A does not change the ontic state at B. The
measurement does sometimes lead to a disturbance, but
this is a disturbance to the ontic state of A. The only
change associated with B is to Alice’s knowledge of B.
Suppose, for instance, that the ontic state of AB was ini-
tially 1 · 1. Alice only knows that it is (1 · 1) or (2 · 2) or
(3·3) or (4·4), and therefore initially assigns the marginal
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 to B. If she measures 1 ∨ 2 versus 3 ∨ 4 on
A, she will obtain the outcome 1 ∨ 2 (by virtue of A be-
ing in ontic state 1), and she will update her marginal
for B to 1 ∨ 2. If, on the other hand, she measures 1 ∨ 3
versus 2 ∨ 4, then she will obtain the outcome 1 ∨ 3 (by
virtue of A being in ontic state 1), and she will update
her marginal for B to 1 ∨ 3. In both cases, B remains in
the ontic state 1 throughout. Alice has simply narrowed
down the possibilities in two different ways.
C. Epistemic states of nonmaximal knowledge
One way to have nonmaximal knowledge of a pair of
systems is to know nothing about their ontic state. This
corresponds to the epistemic state (1∨ 2∨ 3∨ 4)·(1∨ 2∨
3 ∨ 4), depicted as
. (76)
It is analogous to the completely mixed state for two
qubits, I/2⊗ I/2.
In the case of a single elementary system, we found
that knowing nothing was the only way to have nonmax-
imal knowledge. In the case of two elementary systems,
however, there are other possibilities. Since there are
four questions in the canonical set, one could know the
answer to just one of these, rather than two or none.
This corresponds to an ontic base with eight elements.
These epistemic states are also highly constrained by the
knowledge balance principle. Their marginals must be
valid epistemic states for the individual subsystems, and
they must be mapped to valid epistemic states under the
update rule for measurements on one of the subsystems.
Some examples of epistemic states of nonmaximal knowl-
edge that contain eight ontic states but still violate the
principle in some way are
The epistemic states of nonmaximal knowledge that
abide by the principle are again found to be of two types.
The first type is essentially a conjunction of a pure epis-
temic state for one system and a mixed epistemic state
for the other. Examples are (3 ∨ 4) · (1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4) and
(1∨ 2∨ 3∨ 4) · (1∨ 3), which are graphically depicted as
, (77)
and which are analogous to the density operators |1〉 〈1|⊗
I/2 and I/2 ⊗ |+〉 〈+| respectively. These are uncorre-
lated states. The second type of state is more interesting.
Examples are [(1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2)] ∨ [(3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4)] and
[(1∨ 3) · (2∨ 4)]∨ [(2∨ 4) · (1∨ 3)], which are depicted as
, (78)
which are analogous to the density operators 1
2
|0〉 〈0| ⊗
|0〉 〈0| + 1
2
|1〉 〈1| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| and 1
2
|+〉 〈+| ⊗ |−〉 〈−| +
1
2
|−〉 〈−| ⊗ |+〉 〈+| . These are correlated states. Mea-
surements upon one system require an update of the
epistemic state of the other. For instance, if the initial
epistemic state is [(1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2)] ∨ [(3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4)]
and a measurement of 1 ∨ 2 versus 3 ∨ 4 is implemented
on system A, then the final epistemic state of the pair
is (1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2) if the outcome 1 ∨ 2 is obtained, and
(3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4) if the outcome 3 ∨ 4 is obtained. Note
however that other measurements, such as a measure-
ment of 1 ∨ 3 versus 2 ∨ 4, do not lead to an update of
the marginal of the nonmeasured system. Thus, the cor-
relation is not perfect, in the sense defined in Sec. IVA.
The same sort of thing occurs for the density operator
1
2
|0〉 〈0| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉 〈1| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| . There is correlation
for measurements in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis, but none for
measurements in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis. The existence of
a distinction between epistemic states exhibiting perfect
correlations and those exhibiting imperfect correlations
is analogous to the existence of a distinction, in quan-
tum theory, between states that are said to be quantum
correlated, or entangled, and those that are said to be
merely classically correlated.4
Note that states of nonmaximal knowledge are mixed
states. Indeed, they may be viewed as convex combi-
nations of pure states in several different ways. For in-
4 Again, this is not to say that perfect correlations in the toy theory
have all the features of quantum correlations. In particular, they
do not violate any Bell inequality.
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stance,
= +cx
= +cx
= +cx . (79)
Coherent binary operations on the pure epistemic
states of a pair of systems could also be defined, but
we shall not do so here. Note that our definitions of dis-
jointness and compatibility and of the fidelity between
epistemic states, presented in the context of a single ele-
mentary system in Sec. III A, are applicable for composite
systems as well.
D. Transformations
The transformations that can be performed upon a
pair of systems is a subset of the set of permutations
of the sixteen ontic states. It is a subset because some
permutations take valid epistemic states to invalid ones.
For instance, the permutation
(80)
is invalid because it leads to the transition
→ . (81)
Independent permutations of each subsystem’s ontic
states are among the subset of allowed permutations of
the composite’s ontic states. For instance, the permuta-
tion (12)(3)(4) on system A yields
, (82)
and the permutation (12)(3)(4) on A and (13)(2)(4) on
B yields
. (83)
Clearly, such local permutations cannot change the de-
gree of correlation between the systems: uncorrelated
states are transformed into uncorrelated states and corre-
lated states are transformed into correlated states. These
permutations are analogous to local unitary operations in
quantum theory, which do not change the degree of en-
tanglement. Other permutations can alter the degree of
correlation, and are thus analogous to entangling opera-
tions in quantum theory. One such permutation is
(84)
which yields the transition
→ . (85)
It is analogous to the controlled NOT operation for a pair
qubits [37].
E. No cloning
Given the nature of transformations for a pair of el-
ementary systems, it is possible to prove the existence
of a no-cloning theorem. We begin by reviewing this
theorem in the context of the ontic view of quantum
states [44, 45]. A cloning process for a set of states
{|ψi〉} is defined as a transformation satisfying
|ψi〉 |χ〉 → |ψi〉 |ψi〉 (86)
for all |ψi〉 , where |χ〉 is an arbitrary˙ fixed state. The
idea is that the quantum state of A is unknown and the
goal is to implement a transformation that leaves system
B in this unknown state.
The simplest case to consider is when the set contains
two states {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉}. If |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are nonorthogo-
nal states, then the cloning process is impossible because
it does not preserve inner products, and so cannot be a
unitary map. For instance, a cloning process for the set
{|1〉 , |+〉} satisfies
|1〉 |0〉 → |1〉 |1〉
|+〉 |0〉 → |+〉 |+〉 , (87)
where we have taken the arbitrary initial state of system
B to be |0〉 . The inner product squared between the two
possible initial states is |〈1|+〉 〈0|0〉|2 = 1/2, while the in-
ner product squared between the two possible final states
is |〈1|+〉 〈1|+〉|2 = 1/4.
If one adopts an epistemic view of quantum states,
then the question of whether cloning is possible or not is
a question of whether the epistemic state that pertains to
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one system can be made to be also applicable to another.
It is not the question of whether the ontic state of a
system can be duplicated in another. Here is the manner
in which it is defined in the toy theory. A cloning process
for a set of epistemic states {(ai ∨ bi)} is defined as a
transformation satisfying
(ai ∨ bi) · (c ∨ d)→ (ai ∨ bi) · (ai ∨ bi) (88)
for all epistemic states ai ∨ bi in the set, where c ∨ d is
an arbitrary initial epistemic state for B. The cloning
process cannot be implemented for nondisjoint epistemic
states because it leads to a decrease in the classical fi-
delity (defined in Sec. III A) and because this fidelity is
preserved under permutations. This is easily illustrated
by an example. The analogue of the cloning process
for the set {|1〉 , |+〉} is the cloning process for the set
{3 ∨ 4, 1 ∨ 3}. We require
(3 ∨ 4) · (1 ∨ 2) → (3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4)
(1 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 2) → (1 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 3). (89)
where we have taken the arbitrary initial epistemic state
for B to be 1 ∨ 2. Graphically, this is depicted as
→
→ . (90)
Imagine that the upper and lower diagrams are super-
imposed on top of one another. It is then easy to see
that there are two ontic states in the overlap of the two
possible initial epistemic states, namely, the ontic states
3 · 1 and 3 · 2, whereas there is only one ontic state in the
overlap of the two possible final epistemic states, namely,
3 ·3. However, a permutation of the ontic states can only
change the places wherein the two epistemic states over-
lap, not the number of places where they overlap. Thus,
the cloning process is not a permutation and therefore is
impossible in the toy theory 5
As it turns out, one does not actually need a restriction
on knowledge to obtain a no-cloning theorem. By defin-
ing cloning in terms of epistemic states rather than ontic
states, one obtains a no-cloning theorem for sets of non-
disjoint epistemic states, even in classical theories Fuch-
scloning,classicalnocloning. A restriction on knowledge
is necessary however in order to have pure states that
are nondisjoint, which is necessary if there is to be a no-
cloning theorem for pure states. In this sense, the toy
theory is more analogous to quantum theory, vis-a-vis
cloning possibilities, than any classical theory.
5 In this case, the fidelity between the initial epistemic states is
1/2 whereas between the final epistemic states it is 1/4.
F. No broadcasting
Broadcasting is a process wherein one’s state of knowl-
edge about a system is duplicated in the marginals of a
pair of systems while allowing that these systems might
become correlated [46]. This differs from cloning inso-
far as the latter does not allow for such correlation. A
broadcasting process for a set of density operators {ρi}
has the form
ρi ⊗ σ →Wi (91)
whereWi is a density operator for the composite AB that
has marginals
TrA(Wi) = TrB(Wi) = ρi. (92)
Broadcasting is only possible in quantum theory for a set
of commuting density operators [46].
The simplest case to consider is when the set {ρi} con-
tains only pure states. Since nonorthogonal pure states
do not commute, these cannot be broadcast. However,
one does not need the result of Ref. [46] to see this. It fol-
lows immediately from the fact that any quantum state
for AB with pure marginals is uncorrelated. That is, if
ρi is a pure density operator, then the only way to sat-
isfy Eq. (92) is to have Wi = ρi ⊗ ρi. This implies that
the only way to duplicate a pure state of a system in the
marginals of a pair of systems is if the pair ends up in a
product state. But this is simply cloning, and cloning of
nonorthogonal pure states is impossible.
It may seem that the no-broadcasting theorem for pure
quantum states tells us nothing that wasn’t already con-
tained in the no-cloning theorem. However, the former
does capture something that the latter does not, namely,
that pure states can never arise as the marginals of a
correlated state. Although this is mathematically ob-
vious given the formalism of quantum theory, it is a
conceptually significant fact in the context of the epis-
temic view, since pure states are states of incomplete
knowledge within the epistemic view, and it is natural
to expect states of incomplete knowledge to arise as the
marginals of a correlated state. Indeed, in a classical the-
ory any state of incomplete knowledge can arise as the
marginal of a correlated state, and consequently a broad-
casting process exists for any set of epistemic states, even
though a cloning process need not. Specifically, one can
broadcast any set of epistemic states classically as fol-
lows. Measure the ontic state of system A (which can be
done classically), prepare B in this ontic state, then for-
get the outcome of the measurement. The result is that
the marginals for A and B will be whatever the initial
epistemic state for A was, and the two systems will also
be known to be perfectly correlated.
Thus, at first sight, the no broadcasting theorem may
seem to be at odds with the view that quantum states are
states of incomplete knowledge. However, the toy theory
provides an enlightening example of how broadcasting
of epistemic states may be ruled out. First note that
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the classical protocol for achieving broadcasting does not
work in a toy theory universe since one cannot measure
the ontic state of a system. The fact that no protocol can
achieve broadcasting follows from the fact that in the toy
theory, as in quantum theory, pure epistemic states never
arise as the marginals of correlated states. This implies
that a broadcasting process for pure states is simply a
cloning process, and as we saw in the previous section,
such a process is impossible in the toy theory. This proof
has the same structure as the one we provided for quan-
tum theory. In this case, however, we can identify the
conceptual underpinnings of the fact that pure epistemic
states never arise as the marginals of correlated states.
Recall that the pure epistemic states in the toy the-
ory are states of maximal knowledge. Thus, if every
system is described by a pure epistemic state, one has
maximal knowledge about each system. One cannot also
have knowledge of the relations among the systems (that
is, a correlated epistemic state), since this would exceed
what is allowed by the knowledge balance principle. For
example, if the marginal epistemic states for a pair of ele-
mentary systems are a∨b and e∨f respectively, then the
only possible epistemic state for the pair is (a∨b) · (e∨f)
which is an uncorrelated state.
Simply assuming that maximal information is incom-
plete is not sufficient to conclude that broadcasting of
pure states will be impossible. For this, it needs to be the
case that having maximal knowledge of A and maximal
knowledge of B constitutes having maximal knowledge
of the composite AB. The knowledge balance principle
ensures that this is the case in the toy theory.
No-broadcasting formixed epistemic states also admits
an analogue in the toy theory, but we do not consider it
here.
G. Measurements
We now consider the measurements that may be per-
formed upon a pair of systems. Every partitioning of the
set of sixteen ontic states into four disjoint pure epistemic
states yields a maximally informative measurement. If all
of these correspond to uncorrelated epistemic states, we
have a measurement such as
I
I
IV
IVIII
III
II
II
I
I
IV
IV
II
III
III
II (93)
where the different roman numerals represent the differ-
ent outcomes. This is simply a conjunction of a measure-
ment upon the first system and a measurement upon the
second, in this case a measurement of {1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4} on
both. We can represent the measurement on the pair by
the partitioning
{SI , SII , SIII , SIV }, (94)
where
SI = (1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2),
SII = (1 ∨ 2) · (3 ∨ 4),
SIII = (3 ∨ 4) · (1 ∨ 2),
SIV = (3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4). (95)
This is analogous to the product basis
{|0〉 |0〉 , |0〉 |1〉 , |1〉 |0〉 , |1〉 |1〉} (96)
in quantum theory. We call measurements of this type
product measurements.
Other examples of product measurements can be ob-
tained by permuting the rows and columns in the above
example, for instance
I
IV
I
IVIII
II
III
II
III
II
III
II
IV
IV
I
I IV
I
I
IVIV
I
I
IV
II
III
III
II
II
III
II
III II
III
I
IVIV
I
III
II
IV
I
III
II
IV
III
II
I
(97)
which are analogous to the bases
{|+〉 |+〉 , |+〉 |−〉 , |−〉 |+〉 , |−〉 |−〉},
{|+i〉 |+i〉 , |+i〉 |−i〉 , |−i〉 |+i〉 , |−i〉 |−i〉},
{|+〉 |+i〉 , |+〉 |−i〉 , |−〉 |+i〉 , |−〉 |−i〉}, (98)
respectively. Another form that a product measurement
can take is:
I
I
III
IVIII
IV
II
II
I
I
III
IV
II
IV
III
II
which is analogous to the product basis
{|0〉 |0〉 , |0〉 |1〉 , |1〉 |+〉 , |1〉 |−〉} (99)
in quantum theory.
If the disjoint epistemic states are all perfectly corre-
lated, then we have a measurement such as
I
I
I
IIV
IV
IV
IV
II
II
II
II
III
III
III
III
. (100)
This example is analogous to the Bell basis
{
∣
∣Φ+
〉
,
∣
∣Φ−
〉
,
∣
∣Ψ+
〉
,
∣
∣Ψ−
〉}, (101)
where
∣
∣Φ±
〉
=
√
2
−1
(|0〉 |0〉 ± |1〉 |1〉),
∣
∣Ψ±
〉
=
√
2
−1
(|0〉 |1〉 ± |1〉 |0〉). (102)
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Other examples of measurements composed entirely of
correlated epistemic states include:
I
I
II
IIIII
III
IV
IV
II
II
I
I
III
IV
IV
III III
II
IV
III
III
I
IV
IV
I
III
II
III
IV
I
II II
IV
III
IIII
I
II
IV
I
III
IV
II
III
II
IV
I
. (103)
There also exist measurements that are composed of
some uncorrelated and some correlated epistemic states,
for instance:
I
I
I
IIV
IV
III
III
II
II
II
II
III
IV
IV
III
(104)
which is analogous to a measurement of the basis
{
∣
∣Φ+
〉
,
∣
∣Φ−
〉
, |0〉 |1〉 , |1〉 |0〉}. (105)
We call measurements that contain correlated epis-
temic states joint measurements since they cannot be
implemented by separate measurements on the individ-
ual systems. Note that joint measurements can only be
implemented directly if the systems are not spatially sep-
arated.
H. Mutually unbiased measurements
In quantum theory, two bases are said to be mutually
unbiased if all the pairwise fidelities between elements
from the two bases have the same value. Thus, bases
{|ψi〉} and {|χj〉} are mutually unbiased if |〈ψi|χj〉|2 is
independent of i and j. The number of mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs) that can be constructed depends on the
dimensionality d of the Hilbert space. For d a power of
a prime, there are d+ 1 MUBs [47].
For a single qubit, the number of MUBs that can be
constructed is three. An example of such a triplet of
MUBs is
{|0〉 , |1〉}, {|+〉 , |−〉}, {|+i〉 , |−i〉}. (106)
For a pair of qubits, one can construct five MUBs, an
example being
{|0〉 |0〉 , |0〉 |1〉 , |1〉 |0〉 , |1〉 |1〉},
{|+〉 |+〉 , |−〉 |−〉 , |+〉 |−〉 , |−〉 |+〉},
{|−i〉 |−i〉 , |+i〉 |+i〉 , |−i〉 |+i〉 , |+i〉 |−i〉},
{I ⊗ U
∣
∣Φ+
〉
, I ⊗ U
∣
∣Φ−
〉
, I ⊗ U
∣
∣Ψ+
〉
, I ⊗ U
∣
∣Ψ−
〉}
{I ⊗ V
∣
∣Φ+
〉
, I ⊗ V
∣
∣Φ−
〉
, I ⊗ V
∣
∣Ψ+
〉
, I ⊗ V
∣
∣Ψ−
〉}
(107)
where U is the unitary map that corresponds to a clock-
wise rotation by 120◦ about the xˆ + yˆ + zˆ axis in the
Bloch sphere, and V = U−1 [36].
As discussed previously, the analogue in the toy theory
of a basis of states is a set of disjoint epistemic states
that yield a partitioning of the full set of ontic states.
We call two such partitionings mutually unbiased if all
pairwise classical fidelities (defined in Sec. III A) between
elements from the two partitionings have the same value.
For a pair of pure epistemic states, the classical fidelity
is proportional to the number of ontic states they have in
common. it follows that the number of mutually unbiased
partitionings (MUPs) for a single elementary system is
three:
I II III II I III II II II . (108)
There exist sets of five MUPs for a pair of elementary
systems, an example being the set:
I
I
IV
IVIII
III
II
II
I
I
IV
IV
II
III
III
II I
IV
I
IVIII
II
III
II
III
II
III
II
IV
IV
I
I IV
I
I
IVIV
I
I
IV
II
III
III
II
II
III
II
III III
II
IV
III
III
I
IV
IV
I
III
II
III
IV
I
II II
IV
III
IIII
I
II
IV
I
III
IV
II
III
II
IV
I
.
(109)
We conjecture that the number of MUPs for any number
of elementary systems is equal to the number of MUBs
for the same number of qubits.
I. Dense coding
By transmitting a single qubit from Alice to Bob, the
most classical information that can be communicated is
one classical bit. This is a consequence of Holevo’s theo-
rem. However, if Alice and Bob initially share an entan-
gled pair of qubits, then they can communicate two bits
of classical information by transmitting a single qubit.
This is known as dense coding [48].
The phenomenon is surprising because it is unclear how
adding a resource of entanglement can possibly increase
the capacity for communication given that the distribu-
tion of the resource may occur at a time prior to Alice
even deciding which message she wishes to send, and need
not involve any transmission from Alice to Bob; they
may both simply receive their half of the entangled pair
from a third party. The puzzle is sufficiently acute that
some have suggested that the additional bit of informa-
tion travels backwards in time through the channel that
established the entanglement. A different sort of resolu-
tion of the puzzle is suggested by the analogue of dense
coding in the toy theory. In order to see the extent of the
analogy, we begin by presenting the quantum protocol.
A pair of qubits, A and B, described by the entan-
gled state |Φ+〉 = √2−1(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉), are distributed
to Alice and Bob (A to Alice and B to Bob). Depend-
ing on which of four messages, 00, 01, 10 or 11, Alice
wishes to communicate to Bob, she implements one of
four transformations on A corresponding to unitary op-
erators I, σz , σx, and iσy (where σx, σy , and σz are the
Pauli operators [37]). These transformations map |Φ+〉
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to the four Bell states, |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , and |Ψ−〉 re-
spectively. Since these are orthogonal, they can be dis-
tinguished with certainty. Thus, if Alice sends qubit A to
Bob, he holds the pair and can perform a measurement
of the Bell basis to determine which of the four messages
Alice wished to communicate. In this way, Alice has suc-
ceeded in communicating two bits of information to Bob.
In the toy theory, it is also true that the transmission of
a single elementary system (without a shared resource of
correlation) can only communicate a single classical bit.
The reason is as follows. Although a single elementary
system has four ontic states, allowing it to carry two
bits of classical information, Alice cannot prepare the
system to be in precisely one of these ontic states, nor can
Bob measure which of the four ontic states describes the
system. The best Alice can do is to choose which state
of incomplete knowledge describes the system after her
preparation procedure. Thus, she could encode one bit of
classical information by choosing to perform one or the
other of two preparations associated with the epistemic
states
and . (110)
Bob can distinguish which preparation was implemented
by subjecting the system to the measurement of the form
I II III . (111)
It should be clear that one classical bit is the most that
Alice can communicate to Bob in this way.
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob initially each hold
one half of a pair of elementary systems that are corre-
lated, then Alice can communicate two bits to Bob. Here
is a protocol that achieves this. Suppose that initially
Alice holds an elementary system A and Bob holds an el-
ementary system B, and these are known to be described
by the epistemic state
. (112)
Alice can, depending on which of four messages she
wishes to send, perform one of four permutations on
A, namely, (1)(2)(3)(4), (12)(34), (13)(24), or (14)(23),
graphically,
. (113)
These map the initial epistemic state to the four epis-
temic states
. (114)
There is a measurement that distinguishes these four
epistemic states, namely,
I
I
I
IIV
IV
IV
IV
II
II
II
II
III
III
III
III
. (115)
Thus, if Alice sends the system A to Bob, he can imple-
ment this measurement and determine which of the four
messages Alice wished to communicate.
One can summarize these facts about the toy theory
as follows. Every elementary system has the inherent
capability of encoding two bits of classical information.
However, the knowledge balance principle imposes a re-
striction that prevents Alice and Bob from making use
of this capacity unless they initially share correlated sys-
tems. In a toy theory universe, one cannot come to know
which of four possible ontic states describe a single sys-
tem, because one cannot learn two bits of information
about a single system. However, one can come to know
which of four possible relations hold between two sys-
tems, because one can learn two bits of information about
a pair of systems. Moreover, one can fix which of these
four relations holds by acting on just one of the systems.
Note that the toy theory yields an interesting new per-
spective on how to compare quantum and classical infor-
mation theories: rather than comparing a single qubit to
a single classical bit, as is conventionally done, the toy
theory suggests that it is more appropriate to compare a
single qubit to two classical bits.
J. Nonmaximally informative measurements
In addition to the measurements considered in
Sec. IVG, there are measurements that are not maxi-
mally informative. These do not answer as many ques-
tions as are allowed by the knowledge balance principle.
An example of a product measurement that is nonmax-
imally informative is one that is trivial for one of the
systems. For instance, the measurement that is trivial
on B and distinguishes 1 ∨ 2 from 3∨ 4 on A is depicted
by
I
I
II
IIII
II
I
I
I
I
II
II
I
II
II
I
. (116)
Joint measurements can also fail to be maximally in-
formative. For instance, the measurement
I
I
I
III
II
II
II
I
I
I
I
II
II
II
II
(117)
yields information about the relation between the two
systems, but is not as informative as it could be. Indeed,
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it can be obtained by coarse-graining of the outcomes
of the measurement described by Eq. (93) or the one
described by Eq. (100).
K. Measurement update rule
The transformation associated with measurements
that act upon a single elementary system has been de-
scribed in Sec. III E. The transformation associated with
a product measurement is simply a conjunction of such
transformations on the individual subsystems. For joint
measurements, we must see what the principle dictates.
If the measurement is maximally informative, then in or-
der for it to be repeatable, the updated epistemic state
must assign zero probability to all the ontic states that
are inconsistent with the outcome that occurred. But
no more ontic states can receive probability zero without
violating the principle. If the set of ontic states consis-
tent with the outcome of the measurement is S, then the
updated epistemic state must have S as its ontic base.
This must be true regardless of the initial epistemic state.
This implies that an unknown permutation must occur
as the result of the measurement, specifically, a permuta-
tion drawn uniformly from any set that has the property
of randomizing the elements of S (the set of all permu-
tations of the elements of S, for instance, has this prop-
erty).
For instance, if the initial state is (2 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 2),
and a reproducible measurement of the form of Eq. (100)
(analogous to the Bell basis) finds the outcome I, then
we have
→ . (118)
The situation is more complicated for joint measure-
ments that fail to be maximally informative. Suppose,
for instance, that the initial state is (2 ∨ 3) · (1 ∨ 2), and
that a reproducible measurement of the form of Eq. (117)
finds the outcome I. There are many update rules that
are consistent with the reproducibility of the measure-
ment. For instance,
→ (119)
→ (120)
→ . (121)
Indeed, any epistemic state appearing in Eq. (79) could
be the final epistemic state while still yielding repro-
ducibility.
It turns out that the update rule is not uniquely de-
fined in this case. This is completely analogous to quan-
tum theory, wherein a reproducible measurement that is
not maximally informative can be associated with many
different maps. Which map applies depends on how the
measurement is implemented. One update rule, however,
is particularly common. This is the one wherein the final
quantum state is the projection of the initial quantum
state into the subspace associated with the outcome that
occurs. We can define an analogous update rule in the
toy theory: the final epistemic state is the one with the
highest classical fidelity with the initial epistemic state.
In this form, the analogy to the quantum update rule is
apparent, since the quantum state that is the projection
of the initial quantum state into the subspace associated
with the outcome is the element of that subspace that
has the maximal inner product with the initial quantum
state. In the example provided above, this particular
update rule corresponds to the second rule we depicted,
that is, Eq. (120).
V. TRIPLETS OF ELEMENTARY SYSTEMS
A. Epistemic states
For three elementary systems, each of which has four
ontic states, there are 64 ontic states in all. We can
represent these by a 4 × 4 × 4 grid of boxes, with the
three systems labelled by A, B and C.
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 412
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A
B
C
(122)
There are six yes/no questions in a canonical set for the
three systems. In a state of maximal knowledge, three
questions are answered and three are unanswered, which
implies that a state of maximal knowledge contains eight
ontic states. Any pair of systems in the triplet must also
abide by the principle, so that the marginal distributions
for the pairs must all be of one of the forms described in
Sec. IVA.
The pure epistemic states that are allowed by the
knowledge balance principle are of three types: (1) no
correlations between any of the systems, (2) correlations
between one pair of the systems, and (3) correlations be-
tween all three systems. We shall see that these are anal-
ogous, respectively, to product states, products of a Bell
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state and a pure state, and the so-called Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [49].
The uncorrelated epistemic states are of the form
(1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2) (123)
to within local permutations. The marginals over any
pair of systems are pure uncorrelated epistemic states.
For instance, the marginal on AB is simply (1∨2)·(1∨2).
We can represent the epistemic states graphically as col-
lections of solid coloured 1× 1× 1 blocks in our 4× 4× 4
grid, and the marginals as the shadows of these blocks.
For instance, the example of Eq. (123) is represented
graphically as follows:
. (124)
This is analogous to the quantum state |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 .
The pair-correlated epistemic states are of the form
[(1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4)] · (1 ∨ 2), (125)
to within local permutations. This is represented graph-
ically as
, (126)
and is analogous to 1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉) |0〉 .
The triplet-correlated epistemic states have the form
(1 · 1 · 1) ∨ (1 · 2 · 2) ∨ (2 · 1 · 2) ∨ (2 · 2 · 1)
∨(3 · 3 · 3) ∨ (3 · 4 · 4) ∨ (4 · 3 · 4) ∨ (4 · 4 · 3)
(127)
to within local permutations. The marginals over every
pair of elementary systems are correlated mixed states.
For the particular example we have provided, they are
all of the form [(1 ∨ 2) · (1 ∨ 2)] ∨ [(3 ∨ 4) · (3 ∨ 4)] . This
is represented graphically as follows
. (128)
This epistemic state is analogous to the GHZ state for
three qubits of the form 1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉 |1〉) which
has marginals 1
2
|00〉 〈00| + 1
2
|11〉 〈11| over every pair of
subsystems.
B. The monogamy of pure entanglement
In quantum theory, a system can be pure entangled
with only one other system. The reason is that if A and
B are pure entangled, then the reduced density operator
over AB is a pure state. However, for the composite AB
to be entangled with another system, the reduced den-
sity operator of AB must be mixed. Consequently, there
is no entanglement between AB and any other system,
and thus no entanglement between A and any other sys-
tem besides B. This feature of pure state entanglement is
sometimes referred to as the monogamy of entanglement
[50].
From the epistemic perspective, the monogamy of pure
entanglement is a monogamy of perfect correlations. In
both classical theories and the toy theory, a pair of sys-
tems are perfectly correlated if one knows the precise re-
lation between their ontic states. Perfect correlations are
monogamous if a system can only be perfectly correlated
with one other.
Classical statistical theories are polygamous when it
comes to perfect correlations. For instance, it is possible
to know that three systems, A,B and C, are in precisely
the same ontic state. In this case, A is perfectly corre-
lated with B and perfectly correlated with C.
The toy theory, however, forbids such polygamy. We
demonstrate this in the case of three elementary systems
by supposing the contrary and deriving a contradiction
with the knowledge balance principle. Suppose three el-
ementary systems, A, B and C, are all pairwise perfectly
correlated. This would imply that for every ontic state
of A there was associated a unique ontic state of B and
a unique ontic state of C. For instance, one way for A,B
and C to be perfectly correlated would be if they were
known to be in precisely the same ontic state, that is, if
the epistemic state was (1·1·1)∨(2·2·2)∨(3·3·3)∨(4·4·4).
This epistemic state and its marginals are represented
graphically as follows:
. (129)
But this is not one of the three valid forms of epistemic
state for a triplet of elementary systems. The problem is
that it contains only four ontic states rather than eight,
which is the minimum number that is allowed by the
knowledge balance principle.
C. Teleportation
A teleportation protocol in quantum theory makes use
of a pair of qubits that are maximally entangled and a
classical channel in order to transfer the applicability of
23
an unknown quantum state from a qubit in Alice’s pos-
session to one in Bob’s possession [51]. We shall begin by
providing a standard account of how teleportation works,
which assumes an ontic view of quantum states.
A pair of qubits, denoted A and B, are prepared in
the quantum state |Φ+〉 = √2−1 (|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉) , after
which A is given to Alice and B to Bob. A third party,
Victor, prepares another system, denoted A′, in the quan-
tum state |ψ〉 , and passes it to Alice. The identity of A′’s
quantum state is unknown to Alice and Bob. Their task
is to implement a protocol that leaves B in the quantum
state |ψ〉 . The initial quantum state of A′AB is
|ψ〉 ∣∣Φ+〉 (130)
It turns out that this can be rewritten as follows
1
2
∣∣Φ+
〉 |ψ〉+ 1
2
(I ⊗ σz)
∣∣Φ+
〉
σz |ψ〉
+
1
2
(I ⊗ σx)
∣
∣Φ+
〉
σx |ψ〉+ 1
2
(I ⊗ iσy)
∣
∣Φ+
〉
iσy |ψ〉 .
(131)
Note that (I ⊗ σz) |Φ+〉 = |Φ−〉 , (I ⊗ σx) |Φ+〉 = |Ψ+〉 ,
and (I ⊗ iσy) |Φ+〉 = |Ψ−〉 , so that the states for A′A in
this decomposition are just the elements of the Bell basis.
If Alice measures the Bell basis on A′A and obtains the
outcome associated with the unitary operator U , where
U ∈ {I, σz, σx, iσy}, then the quantum state of A′AB is
updated to
(I ⊗ U) ∣∣Φ+〉U |ψ〉 . (132)
If she classically communicates to Bob the identity of U
– only two bits of information are required to do so –
then Bob can apply the inverse of U to B to leave A′AB
in the state
(I ⊗ U)
∣
∣Φ+
〉 |ψ〉 . (133)
Thus, at the end of the protocol the quantum state ofB is
|ψ〉 , as required, and A′A is left in one of the Bell states.
The protocol succeeds regardless of the identity of |ψ〉 ,
so Alice and Bob need not know its identity. Note that
if system A′ is entangled with a fourth system, C, then
the quantum state of A′C is transferred to BC, which is
known as entanglement swapping.
Teleportation is often thought to be surprising because
it takes an infinite amount of information to completely
specify a quantum state, but somehow this state can be
transferred from one system to another given the trans-
mission of only two bits of classical information. This
fact is only surprising, however, if one takes on ontic view
of the quantum state. From the perspective that quan-
tum states are states of incomplete knowledge, telepor-
tation is a protocol wherein someone’s knowledge about
the system A′ becomes applicable to the system B, and,
as we shall see, a transfer of the applicability of a state
of knowledge from A to B requires much less communi-
cation from Alice to Bob. We demonstrate this first in
the context of a classical theory, and then in the context
of the toy theory, where there is a strong analogue to the
quantum protocol.
In a classical theory, a transfer of the applicability of a
state of knowledge is easily achieved. Suppose Victor de-
scribes system A′ by some probability distribution p(x)
over its ontic states, and suppose that Alice and Bob
do not know the nature of this distribution. Nonethe-
less, Alice can simply measure the ontic state of system
A′, then communicate this information to Bob, and Bob
can prepare system B to be in this particular ontic state.
Assuming that Victor knows that they have implemented
this protocol, but does not know the outcome of Alice’s
measurement, he will assign the marginal distribution
p(x) to B. However, teleportation requires more than just
getting the marginal distribution for B to reflect the ini-
tial marginal distribution for A′ – the correlations of A′
to other systems must also be reproduced. Since Victor
initially describes A′ as uncorrelated with all other sys-
tems, he should, in the end, describe B as uncorrelated
with all other systems. The protocol we have described
does not quite achieve teleportation because Victor ends
up describing B as perfectly correlated with another sys-
tem, namely, A′. However, this problem is easily fixed:
Alice can simply randomize the ontic state of A′ at the
end of the protocol.
Note that this protocol only requires Alice to commu-
nicate to Bob an amount of information that is sufficient
to specify the ontic state of A′, and this is in general
much less than is required to specify Victor’s epistemic
state (for instance, there might be a finite number of ontic
states, but an infinite number of epistemic states). Note
also that this classical protocol succeeds without Alice
and Bob requiring any resource of classical correlations.
In the toy theory, this protocol does not work since Al-
ice cannot measure the precise ontic state of A′. Nonethe-
less, teleportation can be achieved if Alice and Bob ini-
tially share correlated systems. Here is how it works.
Suppose Alice holds an elementary system A and Bob
holds an elementary system B, and the pair is described
by the epistemic state (1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4)
(analogous to |Φ+〉). It is known that A and B are in the
same ontic state, but it is not known what this state is. A
third party, Victor, sends to Alice a system A′, which he
describes by the epistemic state a∨ b, where the identity
of a and b are unknown to Alice and Bob (analogous to
the unknown state |ψ〉). Victor’s initial epistemic state
for A′AB is
(a ∨ b) · ((1 · 1) ∨ (2 · 2) ∨ (3 · 3) ∨ (4 · 4)) . (134)
Although Alice cannot determine which of the four pos-
sible ontic states applies to A′, she can determine which
of four relations hold between A′ and A. For instance,
she can determine whether the permutation that relates
A to A′ is (1)(2)(3)(4), (12)(34), (13)(24), or (14)(23).
This is simply the measurement of Eq. (100) (analogous
to the Bell basis), applied to A′A.
Suppose the permutation relating A to A′ is found to
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be P. Since the permutation that related B to A prior to
the measurement was identity, one can conclude that the
permutation that related B to A′ prior to the measure-
ment was P. Since Victor’s state of knowledge about the
initial ontic state of A′ (where by ”initial” we mean prior
to the measurement) is a∨b, it follows that, upon learning
the outcome of Alice’s measurement, his state of knowl-
edge about the initial ontic state of B is P [a]∨P [b] where
P [a] is the image of a under the permutation P. Victor
knows that Alice’s measurement does not cause a physi-
cal disturbance to B, so his state of knowledge about its
final ontic state (where by ”final” we mean after the mea-
surement) is also P [a]∨P [b]. On the other hand, A′ and
A do suffer an unknown permutation due to Alice’s mea-
surement, which causes the epistemic state for the pair to
be updated to (1 ·P [1])∨ (2 ·P [2])∨ (3 ·P [3])∨ (4 ·P [4]),
the state appropriate for finding A to be related to A′
by the permutation P. Thus, after Alice’s measurement,
Victor’s epistemic state for A′AB is
((1 ·P [1])∨ (2 ·P [2])∨ (3 ·P [3])∨ (4 ·P [4])) · (P [a]∨P [b]).
To complete the teleportation protocol, Alice commu-
nicates the outcome of her measurement, the permuta-
tion P, to Bob. Since there are four possible outcomes,
this requires Alice to communicate two bits of informa-
tion to Bob. Upon learning P, Bob applies its inverse
to A′. Thus, Victor’s epistemic state at the end of the
protocol is
((1 · P [1]) ∨ (2 · P [2]) ∨ (3 · P [3]) ∨ (4 · P [4])) · (a ∨ b).
The epistemic state a ∨ b, which was applicable to A′ at
the start of the protocol, is now applicable to B. The
epistemic state for the pair A′A is left as one of the four
correlated epistemic states that are analogous to the Bell
states. This is the analogue of teleportation. Had Victor
initially known A′ to have a particular correlation with
a fourth system, C, then at the end of the protocol, he
would judge B to have this correlation with C. This is
the analogue of entanglement swapping.
It should be noted that even if Victor does not learn
the outcome of Alice’s measurement, at the end of the
protocol he still describes B by the epistemic state he
initially assigned to A′ (since he knows that Bob will im-
plement the inverse of P, regardless of the identity of P ).
Note also that we could have chosen a different initial
correlated epistemic state for AB, or a different basis of
correlated epistemic states for Alice’s measurement on
A′A (for instance, the basis associated with the four per-
mutations (1)(2)(3)(4), (1234), (13)(24) and (1432)) and
teleportation could still be achieved. These freedoms are
analogous to freedoms that are present in the quantum
protocol.
In the toy theory, even though it takes more than two
bits of information to specify which of the six possible
epistemic states applies (the analogue of the continuum
of quantum states), the applicability of an unknown epis-
temic state can clearly be transferred from one system
to another using only two bits of information. This is
precisely what is achieved by the protocol we have de-
scribed. In fact, a transfer of the applicability of a de-
scription from one place to another doesn’t require any
communication between those locations. Suppose that
Alice refrains from sending Bob the two bits of informa-
tion specifying the outcome of her measurement, but does
send this information to Victor. It is still the case that in
one quarter of the trials, namely those where Alice finds
the ontic states ofA′ and A to be identical, the applicabil-
ity of Victor’s epistemic state is transferred from system
A′ to system B. The way in which the applicability of an
epistemic state is transferred from one system to another
is not by information transmission between the systems,
but by information transmission to the individual who is
describing the systems.
This toy version of a teleportation protocol is essen-
tially the one provided by Hardy [33], modulo the arbi-
trariness in the choice of the set of permutations. Note,
however, that his goal was to distinguish teleportation
from nonlocality, not to provide an argument for the epis-
temic view of quantum states. His point, that not every
phenomenon involving entanglement involves nonlocality,
is reinforced by other examples we have considered here,
such as remote steering, dense coding and the monogamy
of entanglement.
VI. FURTHER ANALOGUES
There are some more analogies between the toy theory
and quantum theory which we have opted not to present
in detail. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out some of
these, lest the phenomena in question be mistaken as
uniquely quantum.
The first such phenomenon is:
• The existence of unsharp measurements
In quantum theory, measurements on a system are
typically associated with projective-valued measures
(PVMs) or, equivalently, Hermitian operators on the sys-
tem’s Hilbert space. These are known as sharp measure-
ments. There are other sorts of measurements on a sys-
tem, called unsharp measurements, which are associated
with positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) on the
system’s Hilbert space. They may arise by a convex com-
bination of sharp measurements, or by coupling the sys-
tem to an auxiliary system (called an ancilla) and per-
forming a sharp measurement on the composite [37]. In
the toy theory, one can also contemplate certain convex
combinations of measurements, and one can implement
effective measurements on a system by coupling to an
ancilla and measuring the composite. These constitute
unsharp measurements in the toy theory.
Similarly, we have:
• The existence of irreversible transformations
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A transformation on a system in quantum theory is
reversible if it is associated with a unitary map on the
space of density operators for that system. An arbitrary
transformation, however, is associated with a completely
positive trace-preserving linear map [37], which can be
non-unitary. These can arise as a result of a convex com-
bination of unitary maps, or by coupling the system to
an ancilla and applying a reversible transformation to the
pair. Again, operations of these sorts are allowed in the
toy theory, and so irreversible transformations arise there
as well.
The main features of state discrimination tasks in
quantum theory [52] are also reproduced in the toy the-
ory. For instance, we have
• No deterministic error-free discrimination of
nonorthogonal states
• The possibility of indeterministic error-free dis-
crimination of nonorthogonal states (also known as
unambiguous discrimination)
We also have
• No information gain without disturbance in dis-
crimination of nonorthogonal states
The latter phenomenon accounts for the possibility of
key distribution in quantum theory [53, 54]. It follows
that one expects key distribution to be possible in the
toy theory as well.
The toy theory also contains analogues of a few re-
cently discovered phenomena involving product bases,
namely:
• The existence of locally indistinguishable product
bases [55]
• The existence of unextendible product bases (that
is, product bases for which no additional product
state can be found that is orthogonal to every ele-
ment of the basis) [56]
The first phenomena is sometimes referred to as “non-
locality without entanglement” (in fact, this was the ti-
tle of Ref. [55]). This description is perhaps inappropri-
ate given that the toy theory is explicitly local (in Bell’s
sense) and yet reproduces this phenomena.
Another interesting feature of quantum theory is:
• The fact that for every outcome of a maximally in-
formative measurement, there is a unique quantum
state that yields that outcome with certainty.
To be specific, in a measurement associated with the
basis {|ψi〉}, the only state that yields outcome i with
certainty is |ψi〉 . This feature cannot be captured within
an epistemic approach if one allows for arbitrary prob-
ability distributions over the ontic states. The reason
is that within such an approach, measurements corre-
spond to a partitioning of the ontic states into disjoint
sets, and a particular outcome of a measurement is only
certain to occur if the epistemic state prior to the mea-
surement has its ontic base within the ontic base of that
outcome. But if arbitrary distributions are allowed, then
there will be many epistemic states with the same ontic
base. In the toy theory, on the other hand, there are no
two distinct epistemic states with the same ontic base,
since only uniform distributions are allowed. As a result,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the out-
comes of maximally informative measurements and the
pure epistemic states.
We have not exhausted the list of quantum phenomena
that have analogues in the toy theory, however the point
should be clear: the toy theory captures a good deal of
quantum theory.
VII. PHENOMENA THAT ARE NOT
REPRODUCED
There is a certain satisfaction in being able to repro-
duce quantum phenomena in a theory that admits a sim-
ple interpretation. Nonetheless, what is even more inter-
esting is to identify the quantum phenomena that can’t
be reproduced by the toy theory, since these now present
the greatest challenge to the proponent of the epistemic
view, and since these provide the best clues for determin-
ing what other conceptual ingredients, besides the idea
that maximal information is incomplete, are at play in
quantum theory.
Here are some features of quantum theory that are
absent from the toy theory:
• Contextuality (i.e. the existence of a Kochen-
Specker theorem [28, 30])
• Nonlocality (i.e. the existence of a Bell theorem
[31])
• The continuum of quantum states, measurements,
and transformations
• The fact that convex combination and coherent su-
perposition are full rather than partial binary op-
erations on the space of quantum states
• The fact that two levels of a fundamentally three-
level system behave like a fundamentally two-level
system
• The possibility of an exponential speed-up relative
to classical computation, assuming certain compu-
tational problems are classically hard.
We shall consider each of these in turn.
Contextuality and nonlocality. The Kochen-
Specker theorem [28, 30] and Bell’s theorem [31] state
that any hidden variable theory that is local or noncon-
textual cannot reproduce all the predictions of quantum
theory. The toy theory is, by construction, a local and
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noncontextual hidden variable theory. Thus, it cannot
possibly capture all of quantum theory. In the face of
these no-go theorems, a proponent of the epistemic view
is forced to accept alternative possibilities for the nature
of the ontic states to which our knowledge pertains in
quantum theory. It is here that the novel conceptual
ingredients are required. Note that since nonlocality is
an instance of contextuality [57], the latter can be con-
sidered as the more fundamental of the two phenomena.
Indeed, if quantum theory can be derived from a prin-
ciple asserting that maximal information is incomplete
and some other conceptual ingredient, then contextual-
ity may be our best clue as to what this other conceptual
ingredient must be.
Continuum of states, measurements and trans-
formations. The finite cardinality of epistemic states,
reproducible measurements and reversible transforma-
tions in the toy theory is due to the fact that these are
associated respectively with uniform distributions over,
partitionings of, and permutations of a finite set of ontic
states.
Of course, by allowing non-uniform probability distri-
butions over the ontic states, measurements whose out-
comes are determined only probabilistically by the ontic
states, and probabilistic combinations of permutations,
one could have a continuum of distinct epistemic states,
measurements and transformations over a finite number
of ontic states.
As it turns out, however, such a theory cannot repro-
duce the predictions of quantum theory. The proof is as
follows. For every pair of pure quantum states, one can
find a measurement and an outcome of this measurement
such that the first quantum state assigns zero probability
to this outcome while the second assigns to it a non-zero
probability. This implies that the first quantum state
does not contain in its ontic base any state that is in the
ontic base of the measurement outcome, while the second
quantum state does. It follows that every pure quantum
state has an ontic base that is unique to it, equivalently,
every pure quantum state picks out a unique subset of
the ontic states. Since there are a continuum of pure
quantum states, there must be a continuum of distinct
subsets of the ontic states, which is only possible if the
full set of ontic states is a continuum. This proof is due
to Hardy [58]. Since in practice one cannot verify that
the number of distinct pure quantum states is really a
continuum as opposed to being very large but finite, all
one can strictly conclude is that there must be a very
large number of ontic states.
Given these considerations, one is immediately led to
the idea of modifying the toy theory to allow for a contin-
uum of ontic states. In this case, there would be an infi-
nite number of questions in the canonical set. However, if
one were to keep the knowledge balance principle intact,
this would imply that a single elementary system was ca-
pable of encoding an infinite number of classical bits, in
contrast to the single classical bit that can be encoded in
a qubit. Thus, if this variant of the toy theory is to be
analogous to quantum theory, it must also involve some
modification of the foundational principle; we must con-
sider other ways to guarantee that knowledge is incom-
plete. An obvious choice is to assume that for N systems,
only N of the infinite number of questions in a canonical
set can be answered. (There would obviously be a great
imbalance of knowledge in this case, since one’s ignorance
would always far exceed one’s knowledge.) This choice,
however, has significant problems. The most notable is
the fact that there are an infinite number of mutually un-
biased partitionings of an infinite set and therefore such
a theory would have an infinite number of mutually un-
biased measurements. By contrast, in quantum theory
there are only three mutually unbiased bases for a qubit,
and five for a pair of qubits. Other options for modifying
the foundational principle are required here.
Binary operations on epistemic states. We have
seen that there are two types of binary operations de-
fined for epistemic states in the toy theory, analogous
to convex combinations and coherent superpositions of
quantum states. However, these operations are partial;
they are not defined for every pair of epistemic states.
It might therefore seem desirable to close the set of
epistemic states in the toy theory under convex combi-
nation with arbitrary probability distributions. In this
case, the set of allowed epistemic states for a single ele-
mentary system would have the shape of an octahedron
in the Bloch sphere picture. Hardy’s toy theory, for in-
stance, has this feature [33]. Such a variant of our toy
theory has also been considered by Halvorson [59]. How-
ever, there is an important sense in which such a theory
is less analogous to quantum theory than the one pre-
sented in this paper. The toy theory shares with quan-
tum theory the feature that every mixed state has mul-
tiple convex decompositions into pure states, whereas in
this modified version, there are many mixed states that
have unique decompositions. Similarly, in the toy theory,
as in quantum theory, every mixed state has a “purifica-
tion” – a correlated state between the system of interest
and another of equal size such that the marginal over the
system of interest is equal to the mixed state in question
– whereas in the modified version, there are many mixed
states that do not.
The problem with the modified theory is that although
convex combination has been extended to a full binary
operation rather than a partial one, the coherent binary
operations have not been so extended. Moreover, al-
though one has allowed arbitrary weights in the convex
combinations, one has not allowed the analogue of ar-
bitrary amplitudes and phases for the coherent binary
operations. It is likely that a better analogy with quan-
tum theory can be obtained only if both operations are
generalized. Unfortunately, it is unclear how to do so in
a conceptually well-motivated way.
Embedding two-level systems in three-level sys-
tems. The toy theory we have described does not con-
tain anything analogous to a three-level quantum sys-
tem (called a “qutrit” in quantum information theory).
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Nonetheless, a variant of the toy theory does. One sim-
ply needs to change the measure of knowledge to one
that refers to ternary questions (having three possible
answers) rather than binary questions. We can then in-
troduce canonical sets of ternary questions, and mea-
sure knowledge in terms of these. The knowledge bal-
ance principle then dictates that in a state of maximal
knowledge, the maximum number of ternary questions
for which the answer is known must equal the number
for which the answer is unknown. The simplest possible
system one can consider is completely specified by the
answers to a pair of ternary questions and thus has nine
ontic states. In a state of maximal knowledge one has
the answer to one of these questions, which corresponds
to knowing that the system is in one of three ontic states.
Although this variant of the toy theory does a good job
of reproducing quantum phenomena involving qutrits, it
cannot be combined, in any obvious way, with the origi-
nal toy theory. For instance, two disjoint epistemic states
of a toy qutrit are not isomorphic to two disjoint epis-
temic states of a toy qubit, since the former involve six
ontic states, and the latter four. This is in contrast
to quantum theory, where two levels of a fundamen-
tally three-level system are isomorphic to a fundamen-
tally two-level system 6.
Similarly, a pair of qubits is described in the same way
as a fundamentally 4-level system in quantum theory.
We could define a variant of the toy theory involving ter-
tiary questions (having four answers), which would yield
an analogue of a fundamentally 4-level system, but this
theory would be distinct from the original toy theory ap-
plied to a pair of elementary systems. For instance, in
the original toy theory a pair of systems must satisfy
the knowledge balance principle at the level of the pair
and at the level of the individual systems, but nothing
analogous to the latter constraint occurs in the variant
involving tertiary questions.
Exponential speed-ups in computation. If it is
indeed the case that quantum computers offer an ex-
ponential speed-up over classical computers for certain
computational problems [37] (we currently do not have a
proof that these problems are in fact difficult for a classi-
cal computer), then such a speed-up would be a feature of
quantum theory that is not reproduced by the toy theory.
This is clear since the toy theory can be efficiently simu-
lated classically. N elementary system of the toy theory
can be modelled by 2N classical bits and every operation
in the toy theory has a counterpart in the classical model
since the toy theory involves a restriction, relative to
the full classical model, on the permissible preparations,
transformations and measurements. Thus, if quantum
theory does offer an algorithmic speed-up, this is likely
to be connected is some way to the other phenomena that
6 The existence of such an isomorphism is one of the axioms in
Hardy’s axiomatization of quantum theory [60].
the toy theory fails to reproduce, such as the contextual-
ity and nonlocality of quantum theory. In this vein, note
that some quantum information-processing tasks that of-
fer an advantage over their classical counterparts have al-
ready been shown to have such a connection, specifically,
random access codes [61] and communication complexity
problems [62].
A distinction between those quantum phenomena that
are due to maximal information being incomplete and
those quantum phenomena that arise from some other
conceptual ingredient is likely to be very useful in the
field of quantum information theory, where there is cur-
rently a paucity of intuitions regarding what sorts of
information-processing tasks can be implemented more
successfully in a quantum universe than in a classical
universe.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Kirkpatrick has considered a model of a system with
two variables wherein it is assumed that the measure-
ment of one variable causes a randomization in the value
of the other [32]. This model exhibits noncommutativity
of measurements as well as an analogue of interference.
The manner in which these phenomena arise for a sin-
gle elementary system in the toy theory is no different.
Kirkpatrick does not, however, consider the possibility of
transformations nor the case of multiple systems. Our
conclusions are also quite different. While Kirkpatrick
emphasizes the classicality of his model, we have tried to
focus on the toy theory’s innovation relative to a classical
theory, namely, that maximal information is incomplete.
Hardy has introduced a toy theory very similar to the
one described here [33]. The elementary systems within
his theory also have four ontic states. Hardy postulates
restrictions on the sorts of measurements that are possi-
ble, and a disturbance upon measurement that random-
izes the ontic state among the possibilities consistent with
the measurement outcome. He also postulates that per-
mutations of the ontic states of a single system are pos-
sible transformations. As possible states of knowledge
he allows for any probability distribution over the ontic
states.
In its treatment of a single system, Hardy’s toy theory
is essentially the same as the one presented here, except
for the fact that the set of epistemic states in his case are
the convex hull of the ones we consider (an octahedron on
the Bloch sphere). Some of the disadvantages associated
with adopting this set of epistemic states were discussed
in Sec. VII. For multiple systems, the differences between
Hardy’s theory and the one presented here are more sig-
nificant. Specifically, the set of measurements allowed
in Hardy’s theory is larger than the set picked out by
the knowledge balance principle, and joint transforma-
tions on several systems are not considered. As a result,
Hardy’s theory is less analogous to quantum theory than
the one presented here. Note however that Hardy in-
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vented his theory for the purpose of demonstrating the
possibility of a local theory that exhibits teleportation,
and for this it is quite sufficient.
Smolin has constructed several toy models involving
“lockboxes” [34]. The motivation for his work is to re-
produce certain information-theoretic phenomena which
have been suggested as postulates for quantum theory,
specifically, no superluminal signalling, no broadcasting,
no bit commitment and key distribution. One of Smolin’s
models, involving pairs of lockboxes, succeeds in this
task. It assumes, however, that every pair of lockboxes
bears a unique label and this assumption has recently
been criticized as unphysical [64].
There is an interesting connection between Smolin’s
theory and our own. By abandoning the assumption of
unique labels, and by formulating Smolin’s model in a
different manner, one obtains a variant of the toy theory.
Suppose that every elementary system (a single lockbox
in Smolin’s terminology) has two possible ontic states,
and thus only a single yes/no question that can be asked
of it. Now assume that the answer to this question is al-
ways unknown. Denoting the two ontic states by 1 and 2,
it follows that the only valid epistemic state for a single
system is 1 ∨ 2, and there are no non-trivial measure-
ments. However, permuting 1 and 2 does not increase
one’s knowledge and is therefore an allowed transforma-
tion. For a pair of such systems, there are four possible
ontic states, and thus two yes/no questions that can be
asked of the pair. Assume that one can know the answer
to one of these questions. Recalling that the marginals
on the individual systems must be 1∨2, it follows that the
only valid epistemic states for the pair are (1 · 1)∨ (2 · 2)
and (1 · 2)∨ (1 · 2). This corresponds to knowing that the
ontic states of the two systems are the same, or knowing
that they are different. The only possible measurement
on the pair is the one that determines whether the ontic
states of the two are the same or different. Note that a
permutation on either system takes one epistemic state
to the other. It is this last feature which is critical for
establishing the impossibility of bit commitment.
Because of the assumption of unique labels for pairs,
Smolin’s model did not incorporate the possibility of cor-
relation between more than two systems. By the lights of
our reformulation however, it is natural to assume that
for three systems (and three yes/no questions) one could
still only have the answer to a single question, while for
four systems, one could have the answer to two, and so
forth. Although the resulting theory will not provide as
good an analogy to quantum theory as does our toy the-
ory, it would be interesting to explore the differences,
since this is likely to shed light on how much work is be-
ing done by the assumption of a balance of knowledge and
ignorance and how much is being done by the assumption
of maximal knowledge being incomplete.
The above models all resemble the toy theory insofar
as they are local noncontextual hidden variable theories.
They do not, however, share the foundational principle
from which the toy theory was derived. By contrast,
Zeilinger has advocated an approach to quantum theory
which is operational, denying any hidden ontic states,
but which adopts a similar foundational principle [35].
Zeilinger’s principle is that N elementary systems rep-
resent the truth values of N propositions. The proposi-
tions to which Zeilinger is referring are propositions stat-
ing the outcomes of measurements on the system, rather
than propositions about the ontic state of the system.
In particular, these propositions concern the outcomes
of measurements associated with a set of mutually unbi-
ased bases (Zeilinger calls these “mutually complemen-
tary measurements”). Note that the structure of the set
of measurements in quantum theory is taken for granted
in this approach; the existence of a particular number of
mutually unbiased bases for an elementary system is as-
sumed rather than derived. Had one assumed that there
was only a single measurement for every elementary sys-
tem, then Zeilinger’s principle would be consistent with
knowing the truth values for all propositions pertaining
to a system and would therefore yield a classical the-
ory. In the toy theory, the ratio of the number of known
propositions to the total number of propositions which
pertain to a system is fixed by the assumption of a bal-
ance between knowledge and ignorance.
Finally, Wootters has recently introduced a represen-
tation of the quantum states of N qubits as real functions
on a discrete space of 4N elements [36]. This is a gen-
eralized Wigner function representation of the quantum
states. Since these functions can be negative, they can-
not be interpreted as epistemic states. Nonetheless, this
approach is likely to facilitate the comparison of quantum
theory to the toy theory.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the consequences of a principle of
equality between knowledge and ignorance to the struc-
ture of the set of possible states of knowledge. We have
examined the manner in which such states of knowl-
edge may be decomposed into convex sums, decomposed
into “coherent” sums, transformed, inverted, updated,
remotely “steered”, cloned, broadcast, teleported, and
so forth. In all of these respects we have found that
they resemble quantum states. This is strongly sugges-
tive that quantum states should be interpreted as states
of incomplete knowledge.
The toy theory contains almost no physics. The mo-
tional degree of freedom was assumed classical, and there
were no masses or charges or forces or fields or Hamilto-
nians anywhere in the theory. Although this is a short-
coming from the perspective of obtaining an empirically
adequate theory, it helps make the case for the epistemic
view. Specifically, it supports the idea that a great num-
ber of quantum phenomena, and in particular all the phe-
nomena that the toy theory reproduces, have nothing to
do with physics, but rather concern only the manipu-
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lation of our information about the world. 7 Since the
spectra of atoms are not reproduced in the toy theory,
these might well be indicative of some real physics, but
no-cloning and quantum teleportation, for instance, are
probably not.
The following questions for future research suggest
themselves:
• Can we derive the knowledge balance principle from
a physical principle governing the interactions be-
tween systems, treating observers as physical sys-
tems?
Most scientific realists seek a universal physical theory,
wherein apparatuses and observers are physical systems
like any other rather than unanalyzed primitives that ap-
pear in the axioms of the theory. Thus, even if one could
derive quantum theory from a set of axioms that included
a principle of maximal information being incomplete, the
question of whether and how this principle could be jus-
tified by some physical principle, governing all systems,
including observers, would be left open. It may be useful
to begin by attempting to answer this question in the
context of the toy theory, rather than in the context of
quantum theory.
• What are the ontic states of which quantum states
are states of knowledge?
Within the context of the research program outlined
here, this question captures the central mystery of quan-
tum theory. Contextuality and nonlocality imply that
there must be some modification, relative to classical the-
ories, of our conception of reality if we are to interpret
quantum states as states of incomplete knowledge about
this reality. Specifically, there cannot be local systems
with attributes that are measured in a noncontextual
way. Many who adopt an epistemic interpretation of the
quantum state abandon the notion that the knowledge
represented by the quantum state is knowledge of a pre-
existing reality. Rather, it is assumed that the quantum
state can only represent someone’s knowledge about the
outcomes of future measurements, or, more generally, the
outcomes of future interventions into the world, for in-
stance, whether or not there will be an audible click in a
certain detector [20]. However, a proponent of the epis-
temic view is not forced to this conclusion. Noncontex-
tual hidden variables and the outcomes of future inter-
ventions do not exhaust the possibilities for the sample
space over which states of knowledge could be defined.
We feel that the most promising avenue for the epistemic
program is to investigate these other possibilities.
• Is there a second principle that can capture the
missing quantum phenomena?
7 This idea has also been defended by Fuchs [22]
A principle stating that maximal knowledge is incom-
plete knowledge is likely to serve as a foundational princi-
ple in a simple axiomatization of quantum theory. This is
the claim that we argue is made plausible by the strength
of the analogy between the toy theory and quantum the-
ory. Nonetheless, this principle is insufficient for deriv-
ing quantum theory. It is intriguing to speculate that
we are lacking just one additional conceptual ingredient,
just one extra principle about reality, from which all the
phenomena of quantum theory, including contextuality
and nonlocality, might be derived. To find a plausible
candidate for a second such principle, it may be useful
to adopt a similar strategy to the one used here to ar-
gue for the first principle: do not attempt to derive all
of quantum theory, but rather focus on the more mod-
est goal of reproducing a variety of quantum phenomena,
even if only qualitatively and in the context of some in-
complete and unphysical theory. In particular, attempt
to reproduce those phenomena that the toy theory fails
to reproduce. Armed with a conceptual innovation that
captures the essence of the missing quantum phenomena,
a path to quantum theory might suggest itself.
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APPENDIX A: DIFFERENCES TO RESTRICTED
QUANTUM
The strong similarity of the toy theory to quantum the-
ory might lead one to believe that the epistemic states,
measurements and transformations that apply to N ele-
mentary systems in the toy theory are simply subsets of
the states, measurements and transformations that apply
to N qubits in quantum theory. This is not the case how-
ever. First, there is the fact that the coherent binary op-
erations in the toy theory are not precisely analogous to
coherent superpositions in quantum theory, as described
in Sec. III A. Second, there is the fact that the set of
transformations in the toy theory includes permutations
analogous to anti-unitary maps, which do not arise in
a restricted version of quantum theory. A third fact is
that the nature of the correlations for mutually unbiased
measurements is different in the two theories, as we now
demonstrate.
Suppose a pair of qubits is described by one of the four
Bell states |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , or |Ψ−〉 , and that one of
three mutually unbiased measurements are implemented
on each qubit: {|0〉 , |1〉} on each qubit, {|+〉 , |−〉} on
each qubit, or {|+i〉 , |−i〉} on each qubit. For each state
and each possible measurement, one obtains either corre-
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lation between the outcomes (the same outcome for each
qubit), or anti-correlation (different outcomes for the two
qubits). The results are summarized in Table II, where
‘C’ denotes correlation and ‘A’ denotes anti-correlation.
One notes that in all cases there are an odd number of
anti-correlations.
{|0〉 , |1〉} {|+〉 , |−〉} {|+i〉 , |−i〉}
∣
∣Φ+
〉
C C A
∣
∣Φ−
〉
C A C
∣
∣Ψ+
〉
A C C
∣∣Ψ−
〉
A A A
TABLE II: Correlations (C) and anti-correlations (A) for dif-
ferent measurements on each qubit of a pair prepared in one
of the Bell states.
We can consider the analogous experiment in the toy
theory. A pair of elementary systems are described by
one of four pure correlated epistemic states (heading the
rows of Table III), and one of three mutually unbiased
measurements is implemented on each system (heading
the columns of Table III). Again, one finds either cor-
related or anti-correlated outcomes, however, the num-
ber of anti-correlations is always even. Since one can-
not achieve an even number of anti-correlations for any
quantum state, it is clear that the toy theory for N el-
ementary systems is not simply a restricted version of
quantum theory for N qubits.
I II III II I III II II II
C C C
C A A
A C A
A A C
TABLE III: Correlations (C) and anti-correlations (A) for
mutually unbiased measurements given correlated epistemic
states analogous to the Bell states.
APPENDIX B: RELEVANCE TO QUANTUM
AXIOMATICS
There has recently been much interest in the possi-
bility of deriving some or all of the quantum formalism
from information-theoretic axioms. Fuchs has popular-
ized the question [20], and it has been addressed in many
recent articles [20, 34, 59, 63, 64]. The toy theory shows
that many of the information-theoretic effects one finds
in quantum theory are not unique to the latter, and this
has important consequences for some proposed axioma-
tizations.
For instance, it is likely that in the toy theory key dis-
tribution [54] is possible, as discussed in Sec. VI. More-
over, it is likely that arbitrarily concealing and arbitrarily
binding bit commitment [65, 66] is not possible in the toy
theory. For instance, the fact that there is an analogue
of remote steering, as demonstrated in Sec. IVB, shows
that an analogue of the BB84 protocol for bit commit-
ment [54] will not be secure against Alice. We have not
rigorously established the possibility of key distribution
and the impossibility of bit commitment, since to do so
properly is a non-trivial task. Nonetheless, our results
strongly suggest the falsity of an informal conjecture that
the possibility of key distribution and the impossibility
of bit commitment together imply quantum theory [67].
Recently, Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (CBH) [63]
have shown that within the context of a C∗ algebraic
framework, one can derive quantum theory from three
information-theoretic postulates: the impossibility of su-
perluminal information transfer through measurements,
the impossibility of broadcasting, and the impossibility
of bit commitment.
As we have shown, broadcasting is impossible in the
toy theory, and since the theory is explicitly local, there
is clearly no superluminal information transfer through
measurement. Moreover, as discussed above, it is very
likely that bit commitment is impossible in the toy the-
ory. These facts do not, however, challenge the CBH
characterization theorem since the toy theory does not
fall within the C∗ algebraic framework. For instance, con-
vex combination is only a partial binary operation within
the toy theory and is not defined for arbitrary probabil-
ity distributions, features that are required within the C∗
algebraic framework [59]. Two possibilities suggest them-
selves: either the assumption of a C∗ algebraic framework
rules out physically reasonable theories, or a closer exam-
ination of those features of the toy theory which cause it
to fall outside this framework will show that it is not
physically reasonable after all. Similar conclusions can
be drawn form the work of Smolin [34].
Although the toy theory might ultimately be a set-
back for the CBH approach insofar as it leads one to
question the innocence of the assumption of a C∗ alge-
braic framework, the fact that it is derived from a sim-
ple information-theoretic principle, the knowledge bal-
ance principle, and the fact that it is so close in spirit to
quantum theory suggests that the prospects for an ax-
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iomatization of quantum theory that is predominantly information-theoretic are actually quite good.
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